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Abstract
Centralized school assignment algorithms must distinguish between applicants with the
same preferences and priorities. This is done with randomly assigned lottery numbers, nonlottery tie-breakers like test scores, or both. The New York City public high school match
illustrates the latter, using test scores, grades, and interviews to rank applicants to screened
schools, combined with lottery tie-breaking at unscreened schools. We show how to identify
causal effects of school attendance in such settings. Our approach generalizes regression
discontinuity designs to allow for multiple treatments and multiple running variables, some
of which are randomly assigned. Lotteries generate assignment risk at screened as well
as unscreened schools. Centralized assignment also identifies screened school effects away
from screened school cutoffs. These features of centralized assignment are used to assess the
predictive value of New York City’s school report cards. Grade A schools improve SAT math
scores and increase the likelihood of graduating, though by less than OLS estimates suggest.
Selection bias in OLS estimates is egregious for Grade A screened schools.
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Introduction

Large urban school districts increasingly use sophisticated matching mechanisms to assign their
seats. In addition to producing fair and transparent admissions decisions, centralized assignment
schemes offer a unique resource for research and accountability: the data they generate can
be used to construct unbiased estimates of school value-added. This research dividend arises
from the tie-breaking embedded in centralized matching. A commonly used school matching
scheme, deferred acceptance (DA), takes as input information on applicant preferences and
school priorities. In settings where slots are scarce, tie-breaking variables distinguish between
applicants who have the same preferences and are subject to the same priorities. Holding
preferences and priorities fixed, stochastic tie-breakers become a source of quasi-experimental
variation in school assignment.
Many districts break ties with a single random variable, often described as a “lottery number”. Abdulkadiroğlu, Angrist, Narita and Pathak (2017b) show that lottery tie-breaking assigns
students to schools as in a stratified randomized trial. That is, conditional on preferences and
priorities, admission offers generated by such systems are randomly assigned and therefore independent of potential outcomes. In practice, however, preferences and priorities, which we call
applicant type, are too finely distributed for full non-parametric conditioning to be useful. The
key to a feasible DA-based research design is the DA propensity score, defined as the probability of school assignment conditional on preferences and priorities. In a match with lottery
tie-breaking, conditioning on the scalar DA propensity score is sufficient to make assignment
ignorable, that is, independent of potential outcomes. Moreover, because the DA propensity
score for a market with lottery tie-breaking depends on only a few school-level cutoffs, the score
distribution is much coarser than the distribution of types.
We turn here to the problem of crafting research designs from a broad class of assignment
mechanisms in which the tie-breaking variable is non-random and potentially correlated with
unobserved potential outcomes. Non-random tie-breaking, used for school assignment in Boston,
Chicago, and New York City, raises important challenges for causal inference in matching markets.1 Most importantly, seat assignment under non-random tie-breaking is no longer ignorable
conditional on type. Exam schools, for instance, select students with higher test scores, and these
high-scoring students can be expected to do well no matter where they go to school. In regression discontinuity (RD) parlance, the running variable used to distinguish between applicants
of the same type is a source of omitted variables bias (OVB).
Other barriers to causal inference in this setting are raised by the fact that the propensity
score in a general tie-breaking scenario depends on the unknown distribution of tie-breakers for
1

Non-lottery tie-breaking embedded in centralized assignment schemes has been used in econometric research
on schools in Chile (Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman, 2013; Zimmerman, 2019), Ghana (Ajayi, 2014), Italy
(Fort, Ichino and Zanella, 2016), Kenya (Lucas and Mbiti, 2014), Norway (Kirkeboen, Leuven and Mogstad, 2016),
Romania (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013), Trinidad and Tobago (Jackson, 2010, 2012; Beuermann, Jackson and
Sierra, 2016), and the U.S. (Abdulkadiroğlu, Angrist and Pathak, 2014; Dobbie and Fryer, 2014; Barrow, Sartain
and de la Torre, 2016). These studies treat different schools and tie-breakers in isolation, without exploiting
centralized assignment. Other related work considers estimation methods in regression discontinuity designs with
multiple assignment variables and multiple cutoffs (Papay, Willett and Murnane, 2011; Zajonc, 2012; Wong,
Steiner and Cook, 2013; Cattaneo, Titiunik, Vazquez-Bare and Keele, 2016).

each applicant type. This means that the propensity score under general tie-breaking may be
no coarser than the underlying type distribution. Moreover, with an unknown distribution of
tie-breakers, we cannot easily estimate the propensity score by simulation. These problems are
solved here by integrating the non-parametric RD framework introduced by Hahn, Todd and
Van der Klaauw (2001) with the large-market matching model used to study random tie-breaking
in Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017b).2 Our results provide an easily-implemented framework for a
wide variety of assignment schemes with multiple cutoffs and multiple running variables, some
of which may be randomly assigned.3
The research value of a matching market with general tie-breaking is demonstrated through
an investigation of the predictive value of New York City (NYC) high school report cards.
Specifically, we exploit variation generated by the NYC high school match, which uses a DA
mechanism that integrates distinct non-lottery “screened school” tie-breaking with a common
lottery tie-breaker at “unscreened schools". The quasi-experimental assignment variation generated by this system is used here to answer questions about school quality in a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) setup.
Our results show that attendance at one of NYC’s “Grade A schools” boosts SAT math
scores modestly and may have a small effect on high school graduation. These effects are
smaller than the corresponding ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of Grade A value-added.
Grade A attendance also boosts measures of college and career readiness. The practical utility of our approach is seen in the markedly increased precision of estimates that exploit all
sources of assignment risk. Motivated by the ongoing debate over screened admissions policies
in public schools, we also compare 2SLS estimates of Grade A effects computed separately for
screened and unscreened schools. These are similar, but OLS estimates showing a large Grade
A screened school advantage are especially misleading. Finally, we address concerns that RD
effects identified solely for applicants close to screened school cutoffs might be idiosyncratic.
Specifically, we show that centralized assignment identifies screened school effects for applicants
with tie-breakers away from screened school cutoffs.

2

School Choice Experiments

School assignment problems are defined by a set of applicants, schools, and school capacities.
Applicants have preferences over schools while schools have priorities over applicants. For example, schools may prioritize applicants who live nearby or with currently enrolled siblings. Let
s = 0, 1, ..., S index schools, where s = 0 represents an outside option. The letter I denotes a set
of applicants, indexed by i. I may be finite or, in our large-market model, a continuum, with
applicants indexed by values in the unit interval. Seating is constrained by a capacity vector,
q = (q0 , q1 , q2 , ..., qS ), where qs is defined as the proportion of I that can be seated at school s.
We assume q0 = 1.
2

We also build upon the “local random assignment” interpretation of nonparametric RD, discussed by Frölich
(2007); Cattaneo, Frandsen and Titiunik (2015); Cattaneo, Titiunik and Vazquez-Bare (2017); Frandsen (2017)
and Sekhon and Titiunik (2017). See Lee and Lemieux (2010) for a survey of RD methods.
3
Large-market results for the special case of serial dictatorship with a single non-random tie-breaker are
sketched in Abdulkadiroğlu, Angrist, Narita, Pathak, and Zarate (2017a).
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Applicant i’s preferences over schools constitute a partial ordering, i , where a i b means
that i prefers school a to school b. Each applicant is also granted a priority at every school.
Let ρis ∈ {1, ..., K, ∞} denote applicant i’s priority at school s, where ρis < ρjs means school
s prioritizes i over j. For instance, ρis = 1 might encode the fact that applicant i has sibling
priority at school s, while ρis = 2 encodes neighborhood priority, and ρis = 3 for everyone else.
We use ρis = ∞ to indicate that i is ineligible for school s. Many applicants share priorities at
a given school, in which case ρis = ρjs for some i 6= j. The vector ρi = (ρi1 , ..., ρiS ) records
applicant i’s priorities at each school.
Applicant type is defined as θi = (i , ρi ), that is, the combination of an applicant’s preferences
and priorities at all schools. We say that an applicant of type θ has preferences θ and priorities
ρθ . Θ denotes the set of possible types. A mechanism is a rule determining assignment as a
function of type and a set of tie-breaking variables that schools use to discriminate between
applicants of the same type.
In our framework, tie-breakers and priorities are distinct because the latter are fixed, while
the former are modeled as random variables. Resampling tie-breakers makes the mechanisms
of interest to us stochastic: the assignment distribution generated by any stochastic mechanism
is induced by the distribution of tie-breakers. In particular, stochastic mechanisms generate a
probability or “risk” of assignment for each applicant to each school. Assignment risk is created
by repeatedly drawing tie-breakers from each applicant’s tie-breaker distribution and re-running
the match, fixing other market features.
Tie-breakers may be uniformly distributed lottery numbers, in which case they’re distributed
independently of type, or variables like entrance exam scores, that depend on type. With lottery
tie-breaking, the relevant distribution is a permutation distribution under which all applicant
orderings are equally likely. Tie-breakers overlap with the concept of a running variable in
simple RD-style research designs. We prefer the term “tie-breaker” because this highlights the
role such variables play in a centralized match. As is typical of RD, non-lottery tie-breakers in
school choice are not uniformly distributed, and may depend on applicant characteristics like
race or potential outcomes, as well as on type.
To describe assignment risk more formally, consider first a market with a single continuously
distributed tie-breaker common to all schools, denoted Ri for applicant i. Although Ri is not
necessarily uniform, we assume that it’s scaled (preserving position or rank) to be distributed
over [0, 1], with continuously differentiable cumulative distribution function FRi (an assumption
we maintain throughout). These common support and smoothness assumptions notwithstanding, tie-breakers may be correlated with type, so that Ri and Rj for applicants i and j are not
necessarily identically or uniformly distributed, though they’re assumed to be independent of
one another.4
By the law of iterated expectations, the probability type θ applicants have a tie-breaker
below any value r is FR (r|θ) ≡ E[FRi (r)|θi = θ], where FRi (r) is FRi evaluated at r and the
expectation is assumed to exist. To be concrete, suppose that the tie-breaker is a test score.
4

We assume that sets of applicants of the form {i|a < Ri ≤ b}, where a and b are constants, are measurable.
A sufficient condition for this is that the mapping from i ∈ [0, 1] to Ri ∈ [0, 1] be left continuous (Aliprantis and
Border, 2006). This is satisfied by reordering applicants by their tie-breaker realizations.
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Suppose also that type θ0 applicants do exceptionally well on tests and therefore have tie-breaker
values drawn from a distribution with higher mean than the score distribution for type θ1 . This
implies FR (r|θ0 ) 6= FR (r|θ1 ). By contrast, when Ri is a lottery number drawn independently
from the same distribution for all applicants, FR (r|θ) = FRi (r) = r for any r ∈ [0, 1] and for all i
and θ. Although lottery tie-breaking is important, many real-world markets diverge from this.

2.1

OVB from Type and Tie-Breakers

Suppose we’d like to estimate the causal effect of attendance at school s on the likelihood of
high school graduation. Under centralized assignment, offers of a seat at s are determined solely
by type and tie-breakers. These variables are therefore the only confounding factors that might
compromise causal inference. Provided we can eliminate OVB from these two sources, the offers
generated by centralized assignment become powerful instrumental variables that identify causal
effects of school attendance.
Our causal quest begins with strategies that eliminate OVB from type. Even in a market with
lottery tie-breaking, students who list schools differently are likely to have different potential
outcomes (many applicants prefer a neighborhood school, for example). On the other hand, since
lottery tie-breakers are independent of potential outcomes, type is the only source of OVB in this
case. Full-type conditioning therefore eliminates OVB in markets with lottery tie-breaking. In
practice, however, matching markets typically have many types (almost as many as applicants
in some cases), rendering full-type conditioning impractical. We therefore exploit the fact that
the OVB induced by correlation between type and school offers is controlled by conditioning on
a scalar function of type, the propensity score.5
To formalize the argument for propensity score conditioning in analyses of school choice, let
Di (s) indicate whether applicant i is offered a seat at school s. The propensity score for school
assignment is the conditional probability of assignment to s, which can be written
ps (θ) = E[Di (s)|θi = θ].
The expectation here is computed using the distribution of tie-breakers. The probability ps (θ)
quantifies the “risk” of assignment to s faced by an applicant of type θ in repeated executions
of a match, drawing tie-breakers anew each time; empirical models that control for ps (θ) are
likewise said to “control for risk.”
Now, let Wi be any random variable independent of lottery numbers. This includes potential
outcomes as well as applicant demographic characteristics. Lottery tie-breaking implies
P [Di (s) = 1|θi = θ, Wi ] = E[Di (s) = 1|θi = θ] = ps (θ),

(1)

where P [Di (s) = 1|·] is the conditional relative frequency of assignment to s determined by all
possible lottery draws for subsets of applicants. Iterating expectations over type, (1) yields
P [Di (s) = 1|ps (θ) = p, Wi ] = p.
5

Use of propensity score conditioning to control OVB originates with Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
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(2)

In other words, control for risk makes assignment independent of Wi , eliminating OVB. This
conditional independence (CI) relation means that in school choice markets with lottery tiebreaking, empirical strategies that control for risk identify causal effects.
Equation (2) provides a valuable foundation for causal inference. With lottery tie-breaking,
ps (θ) is typically a function of a few key cutoffs. This coarseness makes score-conditioning
preferable to full type conditioning. With non-lottery tie-breaking, however, control for the
propensity score fails to eliminate all sources of OVB: the tie-breaker itself is an omitted variable.
Moreover, it no longer need be true that ps (θ) has support coarser than θ. Finally, with unknown
tie-breaker distributions, ps (θ) is hard to estimate reliably. These problems are solved here by
(a) using a theoretical propensity score to isolate the set of cutoffs that generate assignment
risk; (b) focusing on applicants near these cutoffs. In a limit computed by shrinking bandwidths
around relevant cutoffs, applicants have constant non-degenerate risk of clearing cutoffs even
when tie-breakers are variables like test scores that are correlated with potential outcomes.
We illustrate this fundamental result in a simple scenario with three screened schools, A,
B, and C, each of which uses a common non-lottery tie-breaker, a test score, say, to select
applicants. Let Ri denote the tie-breaker. The assignment mechanism in this example is serial
dictatorship (SD), with applicants ordered by the tie-breaker.
SD, a version of DA without priorities, works like this:
Order applicants by tie-breaker. Proceeding in order, offer each applicant his or her
most preferred school with seats remaining.
Like any mechanism in the DA class (defined below), SD generates a set of randomization cutoffs,
denoted τs for school s. For any school s that ends up full, cutoff τs is given by the tie-breaker
of the last student offered a seat at s. Otherwise, τs = 1. Finite-market cutoffs are typically
random, that is, they depend on the distribution of lottery draws. In large “continuum” markets,
however, cutoffs are constant, a result that motivates our use of the continuum model.6
Suppose applicants differ in their preferences over B and C, but all list A first and that there
are more applicants than seats at A (imagine A is a prestigious selective school). This market
has two types of applicants, those who list B second and those who list C second. With everyone
listing A first, SD assigns A to any applicant with Ri below the school-A randomization cutoff,
τA . The propensity score for assignment to school A is therefore
pA (θ) = E[1(Ri ≤ τA )|θ] = FR (τA |θ).
This simple score nevertheless depends on the unknown distribution FR (τA |θ), itself a function of θ. Type is therefore a source of OVB; applicants preferring B to C might live in better
neighborhoods and have higher test scores, for example. It’s also clear that any applicant who
does well on tests is more likely to be offered a seat at A. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 below
shows that for applicants in a δ-neighborhood of τA , assignment risk converges to 0.5 as δ goes
to zero, and equals 0 or 1 otherwise.
6

Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017b) explores alternative justifications of the continuum model.
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The “local risk” of qualification at A is formalized by partitioning the support of tie-breaker
Ri into intervals around τA . Given bandwidth δ, these intervals are defined by


 n if Ri > τA + δ
tiA (δ) =
(3)
a if Ri ≤ τA − δ

 c if R ∈ (τ − δ, τ + δ].
i
A
A
To establish the conditional independence properties of local risk, let Wi be any applicant
characteristic, such as demographic characteristics and potential outcomes, that is unchanged by
school assignment. This includes tie-breakers other than the one in use at school s.7 Proposition
1 shows that for all applicant types and conditional on Wi , local risk is constant at 0.5 or
degenerate:
Proposition 1. Assume that τA is fixed. Let FR (·|θ, w) = E[FRi (·)|θi = θ, Wi = w] and note
that FR (·|θ, w) is differentiable at τA for every θ and w by virtue of continuous differentiability
of FRi (r). We also assume that FR0 (τA |θ, w) 6= 0. Then, for t ∈ {n, a, c}, all θ, and all w,
lim E[1(Ri ≤ τA )|θi = θ, tiA (δ) = t, Wi = w] = ψA (θ, t),

δ→0

where



 0
ψA (θ, t) =
1

 0.5

if t = n
if t = a
if t = c.

(4)

Proposition 1 is a restatement of results in Frölich (2007), which shows that limiting qualification risk at a single cutoff is constant at one-half, and in an unpublished draft of Frandsen
(2017), which shows something similar for an asymmetric bandwidth. These earlier results omit
conditioning variables and degenerate cases; for reference, our version is proved in the appendix.
The arguments of function ψA (θ, t) include applicant type because risk in more complicated
matches (and for applicants who list A below first in this simple example) depends on type.
Our formulation of Proposition 1 highlights the fact that risk is independent of confounding
variables, potential outcomes, and other tie-breakers. The latter property helps us describe risk
concisely in models with multiple tie-breakers. Proposition 1 can also be rewritten to show local
conditional independence given the propensity score, a result stated below as a corollary:
Corollary 1 (Local Conditional Independence). Let Di (A) = 1(Ri ≤ τA ). Then,
lim P [Di (A) = 1|θi = θ, tiA (δ) = t, Wi = w, ψA (θ, t) = p] = p

δ→0

for p ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}.
This follows by observing that
P [Di (A) = 1|θi = θ, tiA (δ) = t, Wi = w, ψA (θ, t)] = P [Di (A) = 1|θi = θ, tiA (δ) = t, Wi = w],
7

Let Wi = W0i (1 − Di (s)) + W1i Di (s), where W0i is the potential value of Wi revealed when Di (s) = 0, and
W1i is the potential value revealed when Di (s) = 1. Then Wi is unchanged by school assignment when W0i = W1i
for all i. Covariates unchanged by school assignment are independent of lottery tie-breakers.
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and then taking the limit of the right hand side. In this simple example, to know t is to know
p, but the conditional independence described in the corollary carries over to more elaborate
matches.
Corollary 1 formalizes the idea of “local random assignment” suggested by Cattaneo et al.
(2015, 2017) and Sekhon and Titiunik (2017). As noted by Sekhon and Titiunik (2017), most
theoretical work on nonparametric RD identification relies on continuity of conditional expectation functions for potential outcomes rather than restrictions on the assignment mechanism.
Here, random assignment is a consequence of the fact that, given continuous differentiability of
the tie-breaker distribution function, the tie-breaker density is approximately uniform in small
enough neighborhoods around the cutoff.8
Proposition 1 is a key building block for more elaborate statements of risk. The limiting
nature of this theoretical result raises the question of whether Proposition 1 and its corollary have
an operational, empirical counterpart. We demonstrate the empirical conditional independence
property stated in the corollary by evaluating qualification risk for a particular school in windows
of various sizes around this school’s cutoff (we say an applicant is empirically qualified at school
s when he or she clears τs , without regard to school assignment).
Figure 1 describes qualification risk (rates) for applicants to one of NYC’s most selective
screened schools, Townsend Harris (TH). The top panel of the figure compares the probability
of clearing the TH cutoff for two applicant types, those who list TH first and those who list it
lower.9 As can be seen in the left pair of bars in the top panel, applicants who list TH first tend
to be high achievers and are therefore more likely than others to qualify for a seat at TH.
In a sample of applicants near the TH cutoff, qualification rates for the two types are closer.
Specifically, for the sample of TH applicants with tie-breaker values inside an Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK) bandwidth around the cutoff, qualification rates differ by only a few points.
Moreover, cutting the window width to 75% of its original size and then in half leads to further
convergence in qualification rates, with rates in both of these narrower groups remarkably close
to 0.5. This is the convergence in assignment rates predicted by Proposition 1.
The middle and bottom panels of Figure 1 document qualification rate equalization near
cutoffs for groups of TH applicants defined by baseline scores rather than by type. The leftmost
pair of bars compares all TH applicants in the upper and lower quartiles of the baseline math
and ELA (reading) score distributions, without regard to cutoff proximity. Not surprisingly,
applicants with high baseline math scores are far more likely to qualify for a seat at TH than
are applicants with low baseline math scores. The qualification gap by baseline scores narrows
for applicants with tie-breaker values in an IK bandwidth, however, and again approaches 0.5
for both groups as the window width is cut to 75% of its original size and then halved.
It’s noteworthy that the IK bandwidth in this case is insufficiently narrow to equalize qualification rates across baseline score groups. In practice, most RD applications use a data-driven
bandwidth combined with local linear regression to minimize bias. Our empirical strategy likewise uses an IK bandwidth to compute locally regression-adjusted comparisons that also condi8

The empirical consequences of possible jumps and holes in screened school tie-breaker distributions are explored in the online appendix.
9
Although TH runs only one program, it has a new cutoff each year. Qualified applicants in the figure clear
the cutoff for the year they apply.
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tion on the score. As in Robins (2000) and Okui, Small, Tan and Robins (2012), this strategy
amounts to a doubly-robust estimator. We control for theoretical propensity scores, while also
regression-adjusting for tie-breaker effects in case score control is imperfect. The covariate balance tests and robustness checks reported below suggest this approach works well.

2.2

Risk in Serial Dictatorship

Our TH example illustrates local risk. But real school matching problems involves many cutoffs
and a rich variety of types. We explain real-world risk determination in two steps. First, as in
Abdulkadiroğlu, Che and Yasuda (2015) and Azevedo and Leshno (2016), we employ a largemarket model with a unit continuum of applicants to characterize global assignment risk. The
continuum can be interpreted as the limit of a sequence that repeatedly doubles the number of
applicants of each type while doubling each school’s capacity. In the continuum, randomization
cutoffs are fixed, that is, cutoffs are the same across repeated executions of the match with tiebreakers re-drawn each time. As in Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017b), the continuum model reveals
which randomization cutoffs matter for each applicant facing risk at school s. Having identified
which of these cutoffs are relevant for risk determination, we evaluate risk for applicants with
tie-breakers close to them.
This strategy is outlined first for a realistic version of SD with many schools and types.
In SD, applicants seated at school s qualify there and are (necessarily) disqualified at schools
they like better. The building blocks for risk at school s are therefore (a) the cutoff at s and
(b) cutoffs at schools preferred to s. The latter are characterized by a quantity we call most
informative disqualification (MID), which tells us how the tie-breaker distribution among type
θ applicants to s is truncated by offers at schools θ prefers to s. Formally, let Θs denote the set
of applicant types who list s and let
Bθs = {s0 ∈ S | s0 θ s} for θ ∈ Θs

(5)

denote the set of schools type θ prefers to s. For each type and school, M IDθs is a function of
randomization cutoffs at schools in Bθs , specifically:
(
0
if Bθs = ∅
M IDθs ≡
(6)
max{τb | b ∈ Bθs } otherwise.
M IDθs is zero when school s is listed first since all who list s first compete for a seat there.
The second line reflects the fact that an applicant who lists s second is seated there only when
disqualified at the school they’ve listed first, while applicants who list s third are seated there
when disqualified at their first and second choices, and so on. Moreover, anyone who fails to
clear cutoff τb is surely disqualified at schools with lower (less forgiving) cutoffs. For example,
applicants who fail to qualify at a school with a cutoff of 0.5 are disqualified at schools with
cutoffs below 0.5. We can therefore quantify the truncation induced by disqualification at schools
preferred to s by recording the most forgiving cutoff among them.
Type θ cannot be seated at s when M IDθs > τs because those qualified at s can do better
(they qualify at the school that determines M IDθs ). This scenario is sketched in the top panel
8

of Figure 2. Assignment risk when M IDθs ≤ τs is the probability that
M IDθs < Ri ≤ τs ,
an event sketched in the middle panel of Figure 2. We summarize these facts in the following
proposition, which is implied by a more general result for DA derived in the next section.
Proposition 2 (Global Score in Serial Dictatorship). Consider serial dictatorship in a continuum market. For all s and θ ∈ Θs , we have:
ps (θ) = max {0, FR (τs |θ) − FR (M IDθs |θ)} .
SD assignment risk, which is positive only when when the randomization cutoff at s exceeds
M IDθs , is given by the size of the group with Ri between M IDθs and τs . This is
FR (τs |θ) − FR (M IDθs ).
With lottery tie-breaking (and a uniformly distributed lottery number), the SD risk formula
simplifies to τs − M IDθs . With non-lottery tie-breaking, the SD propensity score depends on
the conditional distribution function, FR (·|θ), evaluated at τs and M IDθs .
Proposition 2 leaves us with three empirical challenges not encountered in markets with
lottery tie-breaking. First, with non-random tie-breakers like test scores, conditional tie-breaker
distributions, FR (.|θ), are likely to depend on θ, so the score in Proposition 2 need not have
coarser support than does θ. This is in spite of the fact many applicants with different values of
θ share the same M IDθs . Second, FR (.|θ) is typically unknown. This precludes straightforward
computation of the propensity score by repeatedly sampling from FR (.|θ). Finally, while control
for the propensity score eliminates confounding from type, assignments are a function of tiebreakers as well as type, and non-lottery tie-breakers are likely to be correlated with potential
outcomes.
As in the simple example in the previous section, we address these challenges by evaluating
risk for applicants close to cutoffs. Proposition 2 identifies the relevant cutoffs in markets with
many schools and types. As before, intervals around each cutoff are encoded by relation (3),
but now replacing tiA (δ) with tis (δ) for each school, s. We collect the set of these for all schools
in the vector
Ti (δ) = [ti1 (δ), ..., tis (δ), ..., tiS (δ)]0 .
The following is a consequence of Theorem 1 in the next section, which characterizes local risk
for any DA match.
Proposition 3 (Local Score in Serial Dictatorship). Consider serial dictatorship in a continuum
market. Assume that cutoffs τs are distinct. For each s ∈ S and θ ∈ Θs such that M IDθs 6= 0,
suppose M IDθs = τs0 for s0 6= s. For T = [t1 , ..., ts , ..., tS ]0 ∈ {n, a, c}S , all δ > 0, and all w,
P [Di (s) = 1|θi = θ, Ti (δ) = T, Wi = w] = 0 if τs0 > τs .
Otherwise,


 0
lim P [Di (s) = 1|θi = θ, Ti (δ) = T, Wi = w] =
1

δ→0
 0.5
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if ts = n or ts0 = a
if ts = a and ts0 = n
if ts = c or ts0 = c.

When M IDθs = 0, risk is determined by ts alone as in Proposition 1.
Like Proposition 1 and its corollary, Proposition 3 establishes a key conditional independence
result: limiting SD assignment risk depends only on tie-breaker proximity to the cutoff at s and to
M IDθs ; risk is otherwise unrelated to applicant characteristics.10 Panel C in Figure 2 interprets
this result. Type θ applicants with tie-breakers near either M IDθs or the cutoff at s face risk of
one-half. This fact is an extension of Proposition 1, applied here to the pair of cutoffs driving
SD risk for each type. Applicants with ts = a and ts0 = n have tie-breakers strictly between
M IDθs and τs , meaning they’re disqualified at s0 but qualified at s. Finally, applicants with
ts = n or ts0 = a cannot be seated at s, either because they’re disqualified there or because they
qualify at s0 .
In the empirical (as opposed to theoretical) world, almost all applicants necessarily have
tie-breaker values that are strictly above or below any particular randomization cutoff. We see
applicants with tie-breakers close to either M IDθs or the cutoff at s as special because it is these
applicants for whom qualification is (almost) randomly assigned.

3

The DA Score with General Tie-Breaking

SD is a version of DA without priorities. Student-proposing DA, which nests all school choice
mechanisms in wide use, works like this:
Each applicant proposes to his or her most preferred school. Each school ranks these
proposals, first by priority then by tie-breaker within priority groups, provisionally
admitting the highest-ranked applicants in this order up to its capacity. Other
applicants are rejected.
Each rejected applicant proposes to his or her next most preferred school. Each
school ranks these new proposals together with applicants admitted provisionally in
the previous round, first by priority and then by tie-breaker. From this pool, the
school again provisionally admits those ranked highest up to capacity, rejecting the
rest.
The algorithm terminates when there are no new proposals (some applicants may
remain unassigned).
With multiple tie-breakers, different schools may order applicants differently, but the DA
algorithm is otherwise unchanged. For example, NYC runs a centralized DA match for most
of its high schools, a match that includes a diverse set of screened schools (Abdulkadiroğlu,
Pathak and Roth, 2005, 2009). These schools order applicants using (mostly) school-specific tiebreakers derived from interviews, auditions, or GPA in earlier grades, as well as test scores. A
few screened-school tie-breakers are shared by multiple programs. The NYC match also includes
many “unscreened schools” that use a common lottery tie-breaker.
Formal analysis of markets with general tie-breaking requires notation to keep track of the
tie-breakers. Let v ∈ {0, 1, ..., V } index tie-breakers and let {Sv : v ∈ {0, 1, ..., V }} be a partition
10

Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017a) reference a version of Proposition 3 in a brief analysis of Chicago exam schools.
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of schools such that Sv is the set of schools using tie-breaker v. Schools s and s0 use the same
tie-breaker if and only if s, s0 ∈ Sv for some v. The random variable Riv denotes applicant i’s
tie-breaker at schools in Sv . For any v and students i 6= j, tie-breakers Riv and Rjv are assumed
to be independent when both exist, though not necessarily identically distributed.11 Likewise,
for v 6= v 0 , tie-breakers Riv and Riv0 are initially assumed to be independent, an assumption
relaxed in Theorem 1 below.
Define the function v(s) to be the index of the tie-breaker used at school s. By definition,
s ∈ Sv(s) . We adopt the convention that v = 0 identifies the lottery tie-breaker, so S0 denotes
the set of unscreened (lottery) schools.
With a continuum of applicants, DA assignment risk depends on priorities as well as on tiebreakers and cutoffs. We therefore combine applicants’ priority status and tie-breaking variables
into a single number for each school, called applicant position at school s:
πis = ρis + Riv(s) .
Since the difference between any two priorities is at least 1 and tie-breaking variables are between
0 and 1, applicant position at s is a lexicographic ordering, first by priority then by tie-breaker.
We also generalize cutoffs to incorporate priorities; these DA cutoffs are denoted ξs . For any s
that ends up full, ξs is given by the position of the last student offered a seat at s. Otherwise,
ξs = K + 1.
Our characterization of large-market DA with general tie-breakers follows from the large
market model in Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017b), replacing position as function of a single tiebreaker (ρis + Ri ) with the tie-breaker-specific πis defined above.
In the large-market model, DA sets the cutoff to K + 1 at any school that remains unfilled
and offers a seat at s to any applicant i listing s who has
πis ≤ ξs and πib > ξb for all b i s.

(7)

This is a consequence of the fact that the student-proposing DA mechanism is stable. In particular, if an applicant is seated at s but prefers b, she must be qualified at s and not have been
offered a seat at b. Moreover, since DA-generated offers at b are made in order of position, the
fact that she wasn’t offered a seat at b means she is disqualified there.
Condition (7) nests our characterization of assignments under SD, since we can set ρis = 0
for all applicants and use a single tie-breaker to determine position. Statement (7) then amounts
to saying that Ri ≤ τs and Ri > M IDθs for applicants with θi = θ. In finite markets, cutoffs
ξs are stochastic, varying from tie-breaker draw to tie-breaker draw in repeated executions of
the match. In large (continuum) markets, however, ξs is fixed. Equation (7) therefore yields
a characterization of assignment risk determined by fixed cutoffs and priorities and by the
distribution of stochastic tie-breakers.
Our characterization of DA assignment risk covers all mechanisms in the DA class. Assignments using mechanisms in this class can be computed by student-proposing DA, possibly with
11

Real-world tie-breakers, including those in New York City, are often coded as ranks that may be correlated
across applicants, even when the underlying orderings are independent. For example, in a sample of two, it
matters that only one can be first. Such dependence vanishes as the number of applicants grows, as we show in
Appendix B. Tie-breaker positions therefore satisfy our independence assumption in a continuum market.
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applicant priorities replaced by φ(θi ), where φ : Θ → N|S| is a function of actual priorities. The
DA class includes student- and school-proposing DA, serial dictatorship, and the immediate
acceptance (Boston) mechanism. This class omits TTC, which need not satisfy equation (7).12
After any transformation needed to facilitate DA computation, applicant position at school s is
πis = φs (θi ) + Riv(s) .
The propensity score can then be computed using this transformed position data. In what
follows, we ignore any necessary transformations, continuing to denote priorities by ρis .
The propensity score for DA uses the notion of marginal priority at school s, denoted ρs
and defined as int(ξs ), that is, the integer part of the DA cutoff. Applicants for whom seats
are rationed by tie-breakers have priority ρs . Conditional on rejection by all more preferred
schools, applicants to s are assigned s with certainty if ρis < ρs , that is, if they clear marginal
priority. Applicants with ρis > ρs have no chance of finding a seat at s. Applicants for whom
ρis = ρs are marginal: these applicants are seated at s when their tie-breaker values fall below
randomization cutoff τs , which can now be written as the decimal part of the DA cutoff:
τs = ξs − ρs .
When ρis = ρs ,
πis ≤ ξs ⇔ Riv(s) ≤ τs .
Again, this covers SD, since ρis can be fixed at zero for everyone.
These observations motivate a partition of the set of applicant types. Specifically, partition
Θs , the set of applicant types who list s, according to:
i) Θns = {θ ∈ Θs | ρθs > ρs },

(never seated)

ii) Θas = {θ ∈ Θs | ρθs < ρs },

(always seated)

iii) Θcs = {θ ∈ Θs | ρθs = ρs }.

(conditionally seated)

Never seated applicants have worse-than-marginal priority at s, so no one in this group is assigned
to s. Always seated applicants clear marginal priority at s. Some of these applicants may end
up seated at a school they prefer to s, but they’re assigned s for sure if they fail to find a seat
at any school they’ve listed more highly. Finally, conditionally seated applicants are marginal
at s. These applicants are assigned s when not assigned a higher choice and when they draw a
tie-breaker that clears the randomization cutoff at s. Under SD, all applicants are in Θcs .
12

Under TTC, equation (7) need not be satisfied for all matching problems. But the DA class includes China’s
parallel mechanisms (Chen and Kesten, 2017), England’s first-preference-first mechanisms (Pathak and Sönmez,
2013), and the Taiwan mechanism (Dur, Pathak, Song and Sönmez, 2018). In large markets satisfying regularity
conditions that imply a unique stable matching, the DA class includes school-proposing as well as applicantproposing DA (these conditions are spelled out in Azevedo and Leshno (2016)). For serial dictatorship, φ(θ) =
(0, ..., 0) for all θ ∈ Θ. For immediate acceptance, φs (θi ) < φs (θj ) if i ranks s ahead of j, and φs (θi ) < φs (θj ) if
and only if i and j rank s the same and ρis < ρjs (Ergin and Sönmez, 2006).
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3.1

Global DA Risk

Let Fvi (r) denote the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Riv evaluated at r and define
Fv (r|θ) = E[Fvi (r)|θi = θ].

(8)

This is the fraction of type θ applicants with tie-breaker v below r (set to zero when type θ lists
no schools using tie-breaker v). We again assume tie-breakers have support [0, 1]. As with a
single tie-breaker, distributions of normalized Riv depend on type.
With multiple tie-breakers, qualification at higher-listed choices may truncate the distribution of any or all Riv . We therefore define tie-breaker-specific M IDs for each Sv . To this end,
partition Bθs into disjoint sets denoted by
v
Bθs
= Bθs ∩ Sv ,

for each v. This partition is used to construct tie-breaker-specific M IDs:

v or if B v = ∅

if θ ∈ Θnb for all b ∈ Bθs
 0
θs
v
v
M IDθs =
1
if θ ∈ Θab for some b ∈ Bθs

 max{τ | b ∈ B v and θ ∈ Θc } otherwise
b
θs
b
This extends M IDθs defined in (6) in two ways. In addition to capturing tie-breaker specificity,
v allows for complete truncation of R when θ clears marginal priority at a school in B v .
M IDθs
iv
θs
v and the partition of Θ by priority status determine global DA risk with general
M IDθs
s
tie-breakers:
Proposition 4 (Global Score with General Tie-breaking). Consider continuum DA with multiple tie-breakers indexed by v, distributed independently of one another according to Fv (r|θ). For
all s and θ in this match,
ps (θ) =


 0Q

 Q

v (1

if θ ∈ Θns
if θ ∈ Θas

v |θ))
− Fv (M IDθs

n
o
v(s)
v |θ)) × max 0, F
(1
−
F
(M
ID
(τ
|θ)
−
F
(M
ID
|θ)
v
s
v(s)
v(s)
v6=v(s)
θs
θs

if θ ∈ Θcs

v(s)

0 when v(s) = 0.
where Fv(s) (τs |θ) = τs and Fv(s) (M IDθs |θ) = M IDθs

Proposition 4, which generalizes an earlier multiple lottery tie-breaker result in Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017b), covers three sorts of applicants, corresponding to the partition of Θs .
First, applicants with less-than-marginal priority at s have no chance of being seated there. The
second line of the theorem reflects the likelihood of qualification at schools preferred to s among
applicants surely seated at s when they can’t do better. Since tie-breakers are assumed independent, the probability of not doing better than s is described by a product over tie-breakers,
Q
v
v
v (1 − Fv (M IDθs |θ)). If type θ is sure to do better than s, then M IDθs = 1 and risk at s is
zero.

13

Finally, risk for applicants in Θcs multiplies the term
Y
v
(1 − Fv (M IDθs
|θ))
v6=v(s)

by
n
o
v(s)
max 0, Fv(s) (τs |θ) − Fv(s) (M IDθs |θ) .
The first of these is the probability of failing to improve on s by virtue of being seated at schools
using a tie-breaker other than v(s). The second parallels assignment risk in single-tie-breaker
v(s)
SD: to be seated at s, applicants in Θcs must have Riv(s) between M IDθs and τs .
Proposition 4 allows for single tie-breaking, lottery tie-breaking, or a mix of non-lottery and
lottery tie-breakers as in the NYC high school match. With a single tie-breaker, the risk formula
simplifies, omitting product terms over v:
Corollary 2 (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017b)). Consider a continuum DA match using a single
tie-breaker, Ri , distributed according to FR (r|θ) for type θ. For all s and θ in this market, we
have:

0
if θ ∈ Θns ,



a
1 − FR (M IDθs |θ)

 if θ ∈ Θs ,
ps (θ) =

F (τ |θ) − FR (M IDθs |θ)

 (1 − FR (M IDθs |θ)) × max 0, R s
if θ ∈ Θcs ,
1 − FR (M IDθs |θ)
where ps (θ) = 0 when M IDθs = 1 and θ ∈ Θcs , and M IDθs is as defined in Section 2.2, applied
to a single tie-breaker.
Common lottery tie-breaking for all schools further simplifies the DA propensity score. When
v(s) = 0 for all s, FR (M IDθs ) = M IDθs and FR (τs |θ) = τs , as in the Denver match analyzed
by Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017b). In this case, the DA propensity score is a function only of
M IDθs and the partition of Θs into applicants that are never, always, and conditionally seated.
This contrasts with the scores in Proposition 2 and Proposition 4, which depend on the unknown
and unrestricted conditional distributions of tie-breakers given type (FR (τs |θ) and FR (M IDθs |θ)
with a single tie-breaker; Fv (τs |θ) and Fv (M IDθs |θ) with general tie-breakers). We therefore
turn again to local risk to isolate risk that is independent of type and potential outcomes.

3.2

DA Goes Local

Under general DA, local risk is defined only in marginal priority groups. We therefore modify
the set of tis variables to be

n
c

 n if θ ∈ Θs or, if v(s) 6= 0, θ ∈ Θs and Riv(s) > τs + δ
tis (δ) =
a if θ ∈ Θas or, if v(s) 6= 0, θ ∈ Θcs and Riv(s) ≤ τs − δ

 c if θ ∈ Θc and, if v(s) 6= 0, R
iv(s) ∈ (τs − δ, τs + δ]
s
for each applicant and school. This expands the classification of applicants to school s into
tis (δ) = a, n, or c by including those who fail to clear marginal priority at s in group n and by
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including those who clear marginal priority at s in group a. These classifiers are again collected
in the vector,
Ti (δ) = [ti1 (δ), ..., tis (δ), ..., tiS (δ)]0 .
The local DA propensity score is defined as a function of type and cutoff proximity, as
summarized by Ti (δ):
ψs (θ, T ) = lim E[Di (s)|θi = θ, Ti (δ) = T ],
δ→0

for T = [t1 , ..., ts , ..., tS ]0 ∈ {n, a, c}S . This describes assignment risk for applicants with tiebreaker values above, below, and near cutoffs for any and all schools in the match. We again
require that all tie-breaker distributions be continuously differentiable at randomization cutoffs
and that these cutoffs be distinct:
Assumption 1. (a) For every v and for r = τ1 , ..., τS , Fvi (r|e) is continuously differentiable
0
with Fvi (r|e) > 0 given any event e of the form that θi = θ, Riu > ru for u = 1, ..., v − 1, and
Ti (δ) = T . (b) τs 6= τs0 for any schools s 6= s0 with τs 6= 0 and τs0 6= 0.
This set-up yields a compact and useful characterization of local assignment risk in continuum
DA with general tie-breaking:
Theorem 1 (Local Score with General Tie-breaking). Consider continuum DA with multiple
tie-breakers indexed by v, distributed according to Fv (r|θ), and suppose Assumption 1 holds. For
all s ∈ S, θ ∈ Θs , T = [t1 , ..., ts , ..., tS ]0 ∈ {n, a, c}S , and all w, we have
lim E[Di (s)|θi = θ, Ti (δ) = T, Wi = w] = ψs (θ, T ),

δ→0

where ψs (θ, T ) = 0 if (a)



ψs (θ, T ) =



ts = n; or (b) tb = a for some b ∈ Bθs . Otherwise,
0 )
0.5ms (θ,T ) (1 − M IDθs

m
(θ,T
)
0
0.5 s
max 0, τs − M IDθs
0 )
0.51+ms (θ,T ) (1 − M IDθs

if ts = a
if ts = c and v(s) = 0
if ts = c and v(s) > 0.

(9)

v = τ and t = c for some b ∈ B v }|.
where ms (θ, T ) = |{v > 0 : M IDθs
b
b
θs

The local DA score for type θ applicants is determined in part by the screened schools θ
prefers to s. Relevant screened schools are those at which applicants to s are in the marginal
priority group with a tie-breaker close to randomization cutoffs. The variable ms (θ, T ) counts
the number of tie-breakers involved in such close encounters. As expressed in equation (4) for the
v
single-school case, applicants drawing screened school tie-breakers close to τb for some b ∈ Bθs
face qualification risk of 0.5.
Theorem 1 starts with a scenario where applicants to s are either sure to do better or are
never seated at s and therefore face no risk there. In this case, we need not worry about
whether s is a screened or lottery school. In other scenarios, where applicants fail to improve
on s, risk at any lottery s is determined in part by truncation of the lottery tie-breaker at more
preferred unscreened schools and by possible qualification at more preferred screened schools,
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where qualification risk is 0.5. These sources of risk combine to produce the second line of (9).
Similarly, risk at any screened s is determined by possible qualification at more preferred schools
(lottery and screened) plus an additional 0.5 risk term for those marginal at s. This explains
the addition of 1 to the exponent in the third line of equation (9).
This theorem also yields a general conditional independence relation, similar to Corollary 1:
lim P [Di (s) = 1|θi = θ, Ti (δ) = T, Wi = w, ψs (θ, T ) = p] = p,

δ→0

(10)

for p ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, fixing ψs (θ, T ), DA-generated offers are independent of type and
any Wi that’s unaffected by treatment. Local conditional independence allows us to eliminate
OVB by conditioning on ψs (θ, T ). Moreover, ψs (θ, T ) is typically far coarser than the underlying
type distribution.

3.3

Estimating the Local Score

A sample analog of the theoretical local DA score described by Theorem 1 is shown here to
converge uniformly to the corresponding local score for a finite market, in an asymptotic sequence
that increases market size with a shrinking bandwidth. Our empirical application establishes
the relevance of this asymptotic result by showing that applicant characteristics are balanced
by offer status conditional on estimates of the local propensity score.
The sequence used to study the estimated score increases the size of a random sample of
N applicants. We refer to sampled applicants by the order in which they’re sampled, that is,
by i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }. The applicant sample is augmented with information on applicant type
and large-market school capacities, {qs }, which give the proportion of the market that can be
seated at s. Each applicant is associated with an individual tie-breaker distribution, Fvi (r),
as described above. We observe a realized tie-breaker value for each applicant, but not the
underlying distribution.
Fix the number of seats at school s in each sampled finite market to be the integer part of
N qs and run DA with these applicants and schools. We consider the limiting behavior of an
v , τ , and marginal priorities generated by this single
estimator that uses the resulting M IDθs
s
realization. Also, given a bandwidth δN > 0, we determine tis (δN ) for each i and s. This is used
to compute
v
v
m̂N s (θ, T ) = |{v > 0 : M IDθs
= τb and tib (δN ) = c for some b ∈ Bθs
}|.

Empirical bandwidths in the application below are determined separately for each cutoff.
Our propensity score estimator is constructed by plugging these ingredients into the formula
in Theorem 1. If tis (δN ) = n or tib (δN ) = a for some b ∈ Bθs , then
ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) = 0.
Otherwise,

m̂ (θ,T ) (1 − M ID 0 )

 0.5 N s
θs

0
ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) =
0.5m̂N s (θ,T ) max 0, τs − M IDθs

 0.51+m̂N s (θ,T ) (1 − M ID0 )
θs
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if tis (δN ) = a
if tis (δN ) = c, v(s) = 0
if tis (δN ) = c, v(s) =
6 0.

0 , and m̂
Note that τs , M IDθs
N s (θ, T ) in this expression are sample quantities.
As a theoretical benchmark for the large-sample performance of ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ), we define the
true local score for a finite market of size N . This is

ψN s (θ, T ) = lim EN [Di (s)|θi = θ, Ti (δ) = T ],
δ→0

where EN is the expectation induced by the set of tie-breaker distributions {Fvi (r); i = 1, 2, ..., N }
for applicants in the finite market. This quantity fixes the distribution of types and the vector
of proportional school capacities, as well as market size. ψN s (θ, T ) is the limit of the average
of Di (s) across infinitely many tie-breaker draws in ever-narrowing windows near cutoffs in a
match governed by these parameters. Because tie-breaker distributions are assumed to have
continuous density in the neighborhood of any cutoff, the population average assignment rate is
well-defined for any positive δ.
We’re interested in the gap between the estimator ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) and the true local score
ψN s (θ, T ) as N grows and δN shrinks. We can show that ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) described above converges
uniformly to ψN s (θ, T ) in such a sequence. This result uses a regularity condition:
Assumption 2. (Rich support) In the continuum market, for every school s and every priority
ρ held by a positive mass of applicants at s, the proportion of applicants with ρis = ρ who rank
s first is also positive.
This says that for each priority group at school s represented among applicants in the continuum,
some applicants list s first.
Uniform convergence of ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) is formalized below:
Theorem 2 (Consistency of the DA Local Score). In the asymptotic sequence described above
and maintaining Assumptions 1 and 2, the estimated local propensity score ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) is a
consistent estimator of ψN s (θ, T ) in the following sense: For any δN such that δN → 0 and
N δN → ∞ as N → ∞,
p

|ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) − ψN s (θ, T )| −→ 0,

sup
θ∈Θ,s∈S,T ∈{n,c,a}S

as N → ∞.
Proof. The proof uses lemmas established in the appendix. The first lemma shows that the
vector of DA cutoffs computed for the sampled market, ξˆN , converges to the vector of cutoffs in
the continuum, that is,
a.s.
ξˆN −→ ξ,
where ξ denotes the vector of continuum cutoffs. This result implies that the estimated score
converges to the large-market local score as market size grows and bandwidth shrinks. Specifically, for all θ ∈ Θ, s ∈ S, and T ∈ {n, c, a}S , we have
a.s.

ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) −→ ψs (θ, T )
as N → ∞ and δN → 0.
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The second lemma shows that the true finite market score with a fixed bandwidth, defined as
ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) ≡ EN [Di (s)|θi = θ, Ti (δN ) = T ], also converges to ψs (θ, T ) as market size grows
and bandwidth shrinks. That is, for all θ ∈ Θ, s ∈ S, T ∈ {n, c, a}S , and δN such that δN → 0
and N δN → ∞ as N → ∞,
p
ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) −→ ψs (θ, T )
as N → ∞.
a.s.
Finally, the definitions of ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) and ψN s (θ, T ) imply that |ψN s (θ, T ; δN )−ψN s (θ, T )| −→
0 as δN → 0. Combining these results shows that for all θ ∈ Θ, s ∈ S, and T , as N → ∞ and
δN → 0 with N δN → ∞, we have
|ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) − ψN s (θ, T )|
=|ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) − ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) + ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) − ψN s (θ, T )|
≤|ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) − ψN s (θ, T ; δN )| + |ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) − ψN s (θ, T )|
p

−→|ψs (θ, T ) − ψs (θ, T )| + 0
=0.
This yields the theorem since Θ, S, and {n, c, a}S are finite.
Theorem 2 justifies our use of the formula in Theorem 1 to eliminate OVB in empirical work
estimating school attendance effects.

4

A Brief Report on NYC Report Cards

Since the 2003-04 school year, the NYC Department of Education (DOE) has used DA to assign
rising ninth graders to high schools. Many high schools in the match host multiple programs,
which act like schools, with their own admissions protocols. Each applicant for a ninth grade
seat can list up to twelve programs. All traditional public high schools participate in the match,
but charter schools and NYC’s exam schools have separate admissions procedures.13
The NYC match is structured like the match described in Section 3: unscreened programs use
a common randomly assigned tie-breaker, while screened programs use a variety of non-lottery
tie-breaking variables. Screened tie-breakers are mostly distinct, with one for each school or
program, though some screened programs share a tie-breaker. In any case, our theoretical
framework accommodates all of NYC’s many tie-breaking protocols.14
Our analysis uses Theorem 1 to compute propensity scores for programs rather than schools
since programs are the unit of assignment. But since the match yields a single offer, we can
sum program propensity scores to produce school-level scores and then sum again for groups of
13

Some special needs students are also matched separately. The centralized NYC high school match is detailed
in Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005, 2009). Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2014) describe NYC exam school admissions.
14
Screened tie-breakers are reported as an integer reflecting raw tie-breaker order in this group. We scale these so
as to lie in (0, 1] by transforming raw tie-breaking realizations Riv into [Riv −minj Rjv +1]/[maxj Rjv −minj Rjv +1]
for each tie-breaker v. This transformation produces a positive cutoff at s when only one applicant is seated at s
and a cutoff of 1 when all applicants who list s are seated there.
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schools. The score for attendance at any screened Grade A school, for example, is the sum of
the scores for all screened Grade A schools in the match. For our purposes, an “unscreened”
school is a school hosting any lottery program; other schools are screened. Our analysis refers
to all programs of these types as “screened” since all use some sort of non-lottery tie-breaker.15
In 2007, the NYC DOE launched a school accountability system that graded schools from
A to F. This mirrors similar accountability systems in Florida and other states. NYC’s school
grades were determined by achievement levels and, especially, achievement growth, as well as by
survey- and attendance-based features of the school environment. Growth looked at credit accumulation, Regents test completion and pass rates; performance measures were derived mostly
from four- and six-year graduation rates. Some schools were ungraded. Figure 3 reproduces a
sample letter-graded school progress report.16
The 2007 grading system was controversial. Proponents applauded the integration of multiple
measures of school quality while opponents objected to high-stakes consequences of low school
grades, such as school closure or consolidation. Rockoff and Turner (2011) provide a partial
validation of the system by showing that low grades seem to have sparked school improvement.
In 2014, the DOE replaced the 2007 scheme with school quality measures that place less weight
on test scores and more on curriculum characteristics and subjective assessments of teaching
quality. The relative merits of the old and new systems continue to be debated.
We showcase the use of centralized assignment with general tie-breaking for impact evaluation
by estimating effects of being assigned to a Grade A school. This analysis uses application data
from the 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2013-14 school years. Our sample includes first-time applicants
seeking 9th grade seats, who submit preferences over programs in the main round of the NYC
high school match. Data include school capacities and priorities, lottery numbers, and screened
school tie-breakers, information that allows us to replicate the match. Detail related to our
match replication effort appear in the online appendix.
Students at Grade A schools have higher average SAT scores and higher graduation rates
than do students at other schools. Differences in graduation rates across schools feature in
media accounts of socioeconomic differences in NYC high school match results (see, e.g., Harris
and Fessenden (2017) and Disare (2017)). Grade A students are also more likely than students
attending other schools to be deemed “college- and career-prepared” or “college-ready”.17 These
and other school characteristics are documented in Table 1. Achievement gaps between screened
and unscreened Grade A schools are especially large. This likely reflects selection bias induced
by test-based screening.
Screened Grade A schools have a majority white or Asian student body, the only group of
schools described in the table to do so. These schools are also over-represented in Manhattan,
15

Some NYC high schools sort applicants on a coarse screening tie-breaker that allows ties, while breaking these
ties using the common lottery number. Schools of this type are treated as unscreened schools, adding priority
groups defined by values of the screened tie-breaker. Seats for Ed-Opt programs are split into halves, one of which
screens applicants using a single non-lottery tie-breaker while the other uses the common lottery number. See the
online appendix for an explanation of how Ed-Opt programs are integrated into our analysis.
16
Walcott (January 2012) details the NYC grading methodology used in this period.
17
These composite variables are determined as a function of Regents and AP scores, course grades, vocational
or arts certification, and college admission tests.
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a borough that includes most of New York’s wealthiest neighborhoods (though average family
income is higher on Staten Island). Teacher experience is similar across school types, while
screened Grade A schools have somewhat more teachers with advanced degrees.
Table 2 describes the roughly 180,000 ninth graders enrolled in the 2012-13, 2013-14, and
2014-15 school years. Students enrolled in a Grade A school, including those enrolled in the
Grade A schools assigned outside the match, are less likely to be black or Hispanic and have
higher baseline scores than the general population of 9th graders. The 153,000 eighth graders
who applied for ninth grade seats are described in column 3 of the table. Roughly 130,000 listed
a Grade A school assigned in the match (“Match A”) on their application form and a little over
a third of these were offered a Grade A seat. The difference between total 9th grade enrollment
(about 182,000) and the number of match participants is accounted for by groups of special
education students outside the main match, direct-to-charter enrollment, and a few schools that
straddle 9th grade. Applicants in the match have baseline (6th grade) scores above the overall
district mean (baseline scores are standardized to the population of test-takers). As can be seen
by comparing columns 3 and 4, in Table 2, however, the average characteristics of Grade A
applicants are much like those of the entire applicant population.
The statistics in column 5 of Table 2 show that applicants enrolled in a Grade A school
(among schools participating in the match) are somewhat less likely to be black and have higher
baseline scores than the total applicant pool. Here too, these gaps likely reflect selection bias at
screened Grade A schools. Most of those attending a Grade A school were offered a seat there,
and most ranked a Grade A school first. Grade A students are about twice as likely to go to an
unscreened school as to a screened school.
Enthusiasm for Grade A schools is far from universal: just under half of all applicants
in the match listed a Grade A school first. Around 31,000 Grade A applicants have nondegenerate risk of Grade A assignment, that is, an estimated ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) strictly between 0
and 1, conditional on which there’s variation in offer status. Throughout we use “assignment
risk” to mean an estimated ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) for the relevant set of treatment schools. Applicants
at risk of Grade A assignment, described in column 6 of Table 2, have baseline scores and
demographic characteristics much like those of the sample enrolled at a Grade A school. The
ratio of screened to unscreened enrollment among those with Grade A risk is also similar to the
corresponding ratio in the sample of enrolled students (compare 33.4/16.6 in the former group
to 71.9/28.4 in the latter).
The balancing property of propensity score conditioning is documented in Table 3, which
reports raw and score-controlled differences in covariate means for applicants who do and don’t
receive Grade A offers. Score-controlled differences are estimated in the following setup. Let
D1i be a dummy indicating match Grade A school offers and let d1i (x) be a dummy indicating
p̂1i = x, where x indexes values the score might take. Likewise, let D0i indicate offers at
ungraded schools and let d0i (x) be a dummy indicating p̂0i = x. Estimated propensity scores for
Grade A and ungraded schools offers, denoted p̂1i and p̂0i , are computed by summing estimated
scores for Grade A and ungraded schools, respectively. We control for ungraded school offers to
ensure that estimated Grade A effects compare schools with high and low grades, omitting the
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ungraded.18
Let Wi be any applicant covariate measured before assignment, including features of θi .
Balance tests are estimates of parameter γ1 in
X
X
Wi = γ1 D1i + γ0 D0i +
α1 (x)d1i (x) +
α0 (x)d0i (x) + h(Ri ) + νi ,
(11)
x

x

with local linear control for the screened tie-breaker parameterized as
X
h(Ri ) =
ω1s ais + kis [ω2s + ω3s (Riv(s) − τs ) + ω4s (Riv(s) − τs )1(Riv(s) > τs )],

(12)

s∈S\S0

where Ri ≡ [Ri1 , ..., RiV ]0 is the vector of screened tie-breakers, S\S0 is the set of screened
programs, ais indicates whether applicant i applied to program s, and kis = ais × 1(τs − δs <
Riv(s) < τs + δs ) indicates applicants in a bandwidth of size δs around randomization cutoff τs .
Parameters in (11) and (12) vary by application cohort. The sample is limited to applicants
with non-degenerate Grade A offer risk. Bandwidths are estimated as suggested by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012), separately for each program, for the set of applicants in the relevant
marginal priority group.19
As can be seen in column 2 of Table 3, applicants offered a Grade A seat are much more likely
to have listed a Grade A school first, and listed more Grade A schools than did other applicants.
Minority and free-lunch-eligible applicants are less likely to be offered a Grade A seat, while
those offered a Grade A seat have much higher baselines scores, with gaps in the range of 0.3
and 0.4 standard deviations in favor of those offered. These raw differences notwithstanding,
our theoretical results suggest that estimates of γ1 in equation (11) should be close to zero.
This is borne out by the estimates reported in column 4 of the table, which shows small, mostly
insignificant differences in covariates by offer status when estimated using equation (11). The
estimates establish the empirical relevance of both the large-market framework and the notion
of limiting local risk underlying the theoretical results in Section 3.
The encouraging balance results in Table 3 are especially noteworthy in view of Figure
1, which shows that an IK bandwidth is insufficiently narrow to drive the propensity score
for qualification at Townsend Harris to the theoretical limit of one-half. Screened tie-breaker
control via local linear regression mitigates this approximation error. Our local linear regression
estimation strategy, which combines saturated control for the propensity score with linear tiebreaker control can be seen as a “doubly robust” score-based estimator of the sort suggested by
Robins (2000) and Okui et al. (2012), the latter in an IV context. Even if the local score is poorly
approximated, screened tie-breaker controls minimize omitted variable bias from non-lottery tiebreakers. At the same time, the theoretical score tells us which tie-breakers are important and
for whom.
Causal effects of school attendance on test scores are estimated by 2SLS, using offer dummies
as instruments for years of exposure to schools of a particular type. Exposure variables are
18

Ungraded schools are mostly new or had data insufficient to determine a grade.
Bandwidths are also computed separately for each outcome variable; we use the smallest of these for each
program. We set δ = 0 for screened programs if either the number of applicants with Riv ∈ (τs − δ, τs ] or the
number of applicants with Riv(s) ∈ (τs , τs + δ] is less than five.
19
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denoted C1i and C0i for Grade A and ungraded schools, respectively. Effects on graduation
outcomes are estimated by replacing years of exposure with dummies for any Grade A exposure.
The causal effects of interest are 2SLS estimates of parameter β1 in
X
X
Yi = β1 C1i + β0 C0i +
α21 (x)d1i (x) +
α20 (x)d0i (x) + g(Ri ) + ηi ,
(13)
x

x

with associated first stage equations,
X
X
C1i = γ11 D1i + γ10 D0i +
α11 (x)d1i (x) +
α10 (x)d0i (x) + h1 (Ri ) + ν1i
x

C0i = γ01 D1i + γ00 D0i +

X

(14)

x

α01 (x)d1i (x) +

x

X

α00 (x)d0i (x) + h0 (Ri ) + ν0i .

x

Screened tie-breaker control functions in these equations, denoted h1 (Ri ), h2 (Ri ), and g(Ri ),
are analogous to (12). Risk set dummies d1i (x) and d0i (x) are included as in equation (11).
Reported results are from specifications that also control for baseline math and English scores,
free lunch, special education, English language learner indicators, and gender and race dummies
(estimates without these controls are similar, though less precise). The three applicant cohorts
in our sample are stacked, so all parameters except β1 , β0 , γ11 , γ10 , γ01 , and γ00 are interacted
with cohort.
Theorems 1 and 2 imply that Grade A and ungraded school offers are locally and asymptotically independent of potential outcomes conditional on estimates of the relevant local score.
Given an exclusion restriction, the conditional random assignment of school offers supports our
interpretation of 2SLS estimates of β1 and β2 as capturing causal effects of attendance at different sorts of schools. The exclusion restriction in this case means that Grade A and ungraded
school offers have no effect on outcomes other than by boosting time spent at Grade A and
ungraded schools.
This exclusion restriction fails when Grade A and ungraded school offers change school
quality by moving applicants between schools of different quality within the Grade A or another
sector. In other words, exclusion fails if Grade A and ungraded school offers change the type of
school attended through channels other than a school’s grade. We therefore explore multi-sector
models that distinguish causal effects of attendance at different sorts of Grade A schools, such
as screened and unscreened. Estimates of these multi-sector models are discussed following the
discussion of overall Grade A effects.
OLS estimates of Grade A effects, reported as a benchmark in the second column of Table
4, show Grade A attendance is associated with higher SAT scores and graduation rates, and
increased college and career readiness. The OLS estimates in Table 4 are constructed by fitting
equation (13), without propensity score controls or instrumenting, in a sample that includes all
participants in the high school match without regard to offer risk. OLS estimates of SAT gains
are around 6.5 points. Graduation gains are similarly modest at just under 4 points, but effects
on college and career readiness are substantial, running 8-11 points on a base rate around 40.
First stage effects of Grade A offers on Grade A enrollment, computed by estimating equation
(14) and reported in Panel A of Table 4, show that offers of a Grade A seat boost Grade A
enrollment by 1.8 years between the time of application and SAT test-taking. Grade A offers
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boost the likelihood of any Grade A enrollment by about 64 percentage points. This can be
compared with Grade A enrollment rates around 17 percent among those not offered a Grade
A seat in the match.
In contrast with the OLS estimates in column 2, the 2SLS estimates in column 4 of Table 4
suggest that most of the SAT gains associated with Grade A attendance reflect selection bias.
The 2SLS estimate of an effect on SAT math is only around 2.2, though significantly different
from zero with a standard error of about 0.7. The corresponding 2SLS estimate of reading
gains is even smaller and not significantly different from zero, though estimated with similar
precision. The 2SLS estimate for graduation shows a marginally significant gain of 3 percentage
points. The estimated standard error of 0.013 associated with the graduation estimate seems
especially noteworthy, as this means our research design has the power to uncover even modest
improvements in high school completion.20
The strongest Grade A effects appear for indicators of college and career preparedness and
college readiness. These two indicators, the construction of which is detailed in our online
appendix, are determined by various sorts of achievement and certification milestones, and
contribute to the determination of school grades. 2SLS estimates of effects on these outcomes
are remarkably close to the corresponding OLS estimates and estimated with a level of precision
similar to that associated with 2SLS estimates of graduation effects.

4.1

Screened versus Unscreened Grade A Schools

NYC education policy controversies often revolve around access to screened schools. Longstanding policy interest, along with concerns about within-sector changes in school quality that might
violate our 2SLS exclusion restrictions, motivate an analysis that distinguishes screened from
lottery Grade A effects.
The multi-sector estimates reported in Table 5 are from models that include separate endogenous variables for screened and unscreened Grade A schools, along with a third endogenous
variable for the ungraded sector. Instruments for this just-identified set-up are two dummies indicating each sort of Grade A offer, as well as a dummy indicating ungraded school offers. 2SLS
models include separate saturated propensity score controls for each Grade A school sector offer,
as well as for the risk of an ungraded school offer. These multi-sector estimates are computed
in a sample limited to applicants at risk of assignment to either a screened or unscreened Grade
A school.
OLS estimates again provide an interesting benchmark. As can be seen in the first two
columns of Table 5, screened Grade A students appear to reap a large SAT advantage even after
controlling for baseline achievement and other covariates. In particular, OLS estimates of Grade
A effects for schools in the screened sector are on the order of 16-19 points. At the same time,
unscreened Grade A schools appear to generate achievement gains around only one point. By
contrast, 2SLS estimates of multi-sector models, reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, show
equally modest SAT effects for Grade A schools in both sectors. These range from 2-3 points
20

Empirical Appendix Table B1 shows little difference in follow-up rates between applicants who are and aren’t
offered a Grade A seat. The 2SLS estimates in Table 4 are therefore unlikely to be compromised by differential
attrition associated with Grade A offers.
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for math, with smaller estimates for reading that are not significantly different from zero. This
suggests that OLS estimates of the screened school advantage are driven in part by selection
bias.
2SLS estimates also suggest that screened and unscreened Grade A schools both boost graduation rates somewhat, with marginally significant gains ranging from 0.048 for screened to 0.024
for unscreened schools. Estimated Grade A effects on college and career preparedness and college
readiness in column 3 and 4 are markedly larger than estimated effects on other outcomes. This
may in part reflect the fact that Grade A schools are more likely than other schools to offer the
sort of advanced courses that contribute to the college- and career-related composites. Across
all outcomes, however, the 2SLS estimates for screened and unscreened schools in columns 3
and 4 are similar.

4.2

DA Assignment Dividends: RD Away from the Cutoff

The external validity of RD designs is sometimes said to be limited by the fact that causal effects
identified for applicants local to cutoffs need not be representative of effects in the general
population. NYC’s centralized match provides two answers to this critique. The first arises
from the fact that screened school effects can be identified by lottery risk alone. In particular,
unscreened (lottery) schools create assignment risk at screened schools for applicants with tiebreaker values away from screened school cutoffs. To see this, define applicant classifier `is , as
follows:


 n if tis (0) = n
`is =
(15)
a otherwise, if tis (0) = a or if tis (0) = c and v(s) > 0

 c otherwise, if t (0) = c and v(s) = 0.
is
Classification variable `is is defined by setting δ = 0, effectively turning screened-school tiebreakers into priorities.
Paralleling the collection of tis(δ) in the vector Ti (δ), here we collect the group of `is in a
vector,
Li = [`i1 , ..., `is , ..., `iS ]0 ,
and define
λs (θ, L) = E[Di (s)|θi = θ, Li = L],
for L = [`1 , ..., `s , ..., `S ]0 ∈ {n, a, c}S . Note that, having fixed δ = 0, we no longer need be
concerned with limiting risk. Lottery risk can now be written,


if `s = n or if `b = a for some b ∈ Bθs
 0
0
λs (θ, L) =
(16)
(1 − M IDθs )
if `s = a

 max 0, τ − M ID0
if `s = c.
s
θs
The second line of (16) describes non-degenerate lottery risk at screened schools. Lotteries create risk at screened schools because students who list lottery schools ahead of screened
schools need not qualify for lottery-based (unscreened) admission; this happens with probability
0 . Note that λ (θ, L) is equal to zero or to one more often than ψ (θ, T ), especially
1 − M IDθs
s
s

24

for screened schools.21 Still, lotteries may create risk enough to evaluate both screened and
unscreened schools in a match where applicants list schools of both types. This is worth highlighting because evidence on screened school effects generated by lottery risk comes partly from
applicants with tie-breakers far from cutoffs.
Each Grade A school in the NYC high school match has at least a few applicants exposed to
non-degenerate assignment risk in at least one cohort. Many schools have applicants exposed to
lottery risk, but many more applicants are exposed to general risk, that is, risk from lottery or
non-lottery tie-breaking. The y-axis in Figure 4 shows the number of applicants to each Grade
A school added to the at-risk sample by consideration of general risk instead of lottery risk. This
is plotted against the number of applicants subject only to lottery risk on the x-axis. Applicants
are said to have lottery risk when their estimated λs (θ, L) is strictly between 0 and 1. Orange
and blue circles plot numbers of applicants at risk for each lottery and screened Grade A school,
respectively, where circle sizes are scaled by school capacity.
General risk is especially valuable for screened schools. This is apparent from the many
blue circles with positive general risk clustered near the y-axis, meaning they have few or no
applicants subject to lottery risk. But the cloud of blue circles away from both axes show that
many screened schools also have applicants subject to lottery risk. At the same time, screened
schools clearly add applicants to the pool with assignment risk at many unscreened schools.
The estimates in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5, labeled “2SLS using lottery risk", rely on the
assignment risk defined by λs (θ, L) to identify effects of Grade A attendance. Here, λs (θ, L) is
computed separately for offers of seats at screened and unscreened Grade A schools. This allows
us to distinguish causal effects of screened and unscreened Grade A attendance using distinct
offer instruments. Importantly, the lottery-risk analysis generates estimates of screened school
effects for screened school applicants with tie-breaker values away from screened-school cutoffs.
The experiment implicit in this scenario arises from screened school applicants’ disqualification
at more preferred unscreened schools.
Perhaps surprisingly, lottery variation alone is sufficient to capture a reasonably precise
screened school effect, with standard errors under 3 points for the estimated effects on SAT
scores reported in column 5. Although the 2SLS estimates in this case are not significantly
different from zero, they’re close to the corresponding estimates computed using general risk.
It’s also worth noting that standard errors below 3 are small enough to provide statistical power
for detection of SAT gains under one-tenth of a standard deviation (the standard deviation of
an SAT score is around 100). It seems fair to say, therefore, that SAT effects identified using
lottery risk alone are informative for schools in both the screened and unscreened sectors.
Graduation effects identified by lottery risk are small and not significantly different from
zero for either type of school. But these estimates are not statistically distinguishable from
the corresponding effects identified by general risk. Lottery-risk-based estimates of effects on
college and career preparedness, however, are larger than the corresponding estimates identified
by general risk (compare, for example, 0.17 in column 5 to 0.09 in column 3).
Screened school tie-breaking generates especially large precision gains for estimates of screened
school effects. For example, lottery risk alone yields a standard error around 0.89 (shown in
21

The third line of (16) describes lottery risk at lottery schools.
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column 6) for the effects of unscreened school attendance on SAT math scores. This standard
error falls to 0.76 (in column 4) when the unscreened school effect is estimated using general
risk, a precision gain equivalent to increasing sample size by one-third. By contrast, the corresponding precision gain for estimates of screened school effects is dramatic: a standard error of
2.81 using lottery risk falls to 1.24 for estimates exploiting general risk, a gain that otherwise
requires around five times as much data. Similar precision gains from the use of general risk to
identify screened school effects are seen for other outcomes in the table. Lottery risk can indeed
be used to generate useful estimates of screened school effects, but the most powerful estimators
exploit all sources of risk.
A second response to concerns about external validity in this context begins with the observation that, even without lottery tie-breaking, DA may create risk at screened s for applicants
away from τs . As with lottery risk, this sort of risk arises from risk at schools ranked ahead
of s. In the scenario we’re now contemplating, however, all risk is screened. Formally, this
“inframarginal screened risk” is


if ts = n or if tb = a for some b ∈ Bθs
 0
m
(θ,T
)
s
σs (θ, T ) =
0.5
otherwise, if ts = a

 0.51+ms (θ,T ) otherwise, if t = c,
s
for any school with v(s) > 0. Among schools preferred to s, ms (θ, T) counts screened school
tie-breakers that generate risk. When Bθs contains Grade B or lower schools, σs (θ, T ) yields
screened Grade A risk for inframarginal applicants to s, even in a match without lottery schools.
This sort of inframarginal screening risk is depicted in Figure 5, which describes the fate of
four sorts of applicants. All four rank the school Bard first, while ranking Bard Queens, another
school affiliated with Bard College, second. Bard is a Grade B school; Bard Queens is Grade
A. Applicants 3 and 4, plotted in orange, fail to clear the Bard cutoff. This pair is marginal
at Bard Queens, with tie-breaker values inside the Bard Queens bandwidth (applicant 3 is also
marginal at Bard). Applicant 4 clears the Bard Queens cutoff, thereby obtaining a Grade A
seat. Applicants 1 and 2 illustrate inframarginal Grade A risk: both are marginal at Bard, but
below and outside the bandwidth at Bard Queens. One is seated at Bard, the other at Bard
Queens. Applicants like this are exposed to Grade A screened-school risk at schools at which
they’re well-qualified.
The fruits of inframarginal risk are documented in Table 6, which distinguishes effects on
applicants marginal at the screened Grade A school where they’re offered a seat (that is, close to
this school’s cutoff) from effects on applicants offered a screened Grade A seat, though they’re
outside and below the offering school’s bandwidth. To formalize this distinction, let s∗ be a
particular Grade A screened school, say Bard Queens. Marginal applicants at Bard Queens
have tis∗ (δ) = c. Other applicants offered a seat at s∗ have tis∗ (δ) = a.
As a first take on the importance of cutoff proximity, Columns 2 and 5 of Table 6 report 2SLS
estimates identified using screened Grade A offers made to inframarginal applicants only. In
particular, these estimates use a single instrumental variable constructed by interacting screened
Grade A offers with an indicator for tis∗ (δ) = a. The 2SLS setup in this case includes propensity
score controls for this interacted instrument and uses a sample containing applicants subject to
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general risk at either an unscreened Grade A school, a screened Grade A school where they’re
inframarginal, or both. This strategy produces estimates that differ little from those in columns
1 and 4, which repeat the SAT and high school graduation results reported in columns 3 and
4 of Table 5. Compare, for example, an estimated screened Grade A effect of 2.91 in column 1
and the corresponding estimate for inframarginal applicants of 2.59 in column 2. Because the
inframarginal instrument discards information, however, the estimate in column 2 is less precise.
A further exploration of the importance of cutoff proximity adds an endogenous variable to
the general risk 2SLS setup, generating a model with two screened Grade A effects. The first
is for applicants who enroll in a Grade A screened school when assigned a screened Grade A
seat at a school where they have tis∗ (δ) = c; the second is for all others who attend a Grade A
screened school. A screened Grade A offer dummy interacted with dummies for tis∗ (δ) = c and
for tis∗ (δ) = a provides the two instruments needed to identify these two causal effects.
As can be seen in columns 3 and 6 of Table 6, estimates of effects on marginal and other
applicants are similar, though the estimates for marginal applicants are considerably more precise. Test statistics (not reported in the table) show the two sorts of screened A effects to
be statistically indistinguishable. On balance, the estimates in Table 6 suggest the causal effects of screened Grade A attendance are unlikely to be compromised by applicants’ marginal
qualification for selective programs.22

5

Summary and Next Steps

Centralized student assignment opens new horizons for the measurement of school quality. The
research potential of matching markets is extended here by marrying the conditional random
assignment generated by lottery tie-breaking with RD-style variation at screened schools. The
propensity score for DA with mixed multiple tie-breakers allows us to exploit all sources of
quasi-experimental variation arising from any stochastic match in the DA class. Our analysis
also shows how markets with general tie-breakers can be used to study treatment effects at
screened schools for applicants with tie-breakers away from screened-school cutoffs. This addresses concerns, often raised in an RD context, that causal effects identified for applicants local
to cutoffs need not be relevant for the general population.
Our analysis of NYC school report cards suggests Grade A schools generate some gains for
their students, boosting Math SAT scores and graduation rates by a few points. OLS estimates,
by contrast, show considerably larger effects of Grade A attendance. Grade A screened schools
enroll some of the city’s highest achievers, but large OLS estimates of achievement gains from
attendance at Grade A screened schools appear to be an artifact of selection bias. Concerns about
access to such schools (expressed, for example, in Harris and Fessenden (2017)) may therefore be
overblown. On the other hand, Grade A attendance convincingly increases composite indicators
of college and career preparedness. These results may reflect the greater availability of the
advanced courses that contribute to the composites in Grade A schools.
On the methodological side, the NYC analysis demonstrates the precision gains from ex22

Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) reach similar conclusions regarding the external validity of RD estimates of the
effects of attending a Boston exam school.
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ploitation of general risk in markets with mixed multiple tie-breakers. But because different
risk sources affect screened and unscreened school attendance rates differently, the IV exclusion
restriction in this context turns in part on a common effects assumption. It’s therefore worth
asking whether screened and unscreened schools should indeed be treated as having the same
effect. Our analysis supports the idea that screened and unscreened Grade A schools can be
pooled and treated as a homogeneous sector with a common average causal effect.
In an ongoing work, Angrist, Pathak and Zarate (2017) deploy the methods developed here
in a study of Chicago’s exam schools. Chicago combines centralizing non-lottery tie-breaking
with school-specific lotteries. Further afield, our theoretical framework may be applicable to an
analysis of causal effects of centrally-assigned entry-level jobs in medicine and law. For example,
the US National Residency Matching Program assigns medical school graduates to hospitals
using a version of DA with non-lottery tie-breakers (Roth and Peranson, 1999). This match can
be leveraged to answer questions about the effects of alternative medical internships, such as
the value of experience in high-volume hospitals. Our framework may also be useful to study
the effects of resources allocated by some auction mechanisms.
Our provisional agenda for further research also includes an investigation of econometric
implementation strategies, such as bandwidth selection. Zajonc (2012) and Papay et al. (2011)
propose procedures for joint bandwidth selection in RD designs with multiple tie-breakers. Multivariate procedures may have better properties than our one-size-fits-all approach. The relative
statistical performance of 2SLS and semiparametric estimators likewise warrants investigation,
as does the development of propensity score estimators that compute the score by simulation.
Finally, inference on treatment effects in the application discussed here relies on conventional
large sample reasoning of the sort widely applied in empirical RD applications. It seems natural
to consider permutation or randomization inference along the lines suggested by Canay and
Kamat (2017) and Cattaneo et al. (2015, 2017), along with optimal inference and estimation
strategies such as those recently introduced by Armstrong and Kolesár (2018) and Imbens and
Wager (2018).
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Figure 5: The Fate of Four Applicants
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Table 1. New York High School Characteristics
Grade A schools
Grade B-F
All
Screened Unscreened
Schools
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A. Average Performance Levels
SAT Math (200-800)
531
606
481
464
SAT Reading (200-800)
522
587
479
465
Graduation
0.75
0.89
0.68
0.59
College- and career-prepared
0.65
0.84
0.54
0.39
College-ready
0.59
0.82
0.45
0.34
Panel B. School Characteristics
Black
0.20
0.12
0.25
0.32
Hispanic
0.35
0.26
0.41
0.40
Special Education
0.12
0.06
0.16
0.17
Free or Reduced Price Lunch
0.68
0.55
0.76
0.77
In Manhattan
0.27
0.49
0.12
0.16
Number of grade 9 students
420
430
414
413
Number of grade 12 students
374
413
348
351
High school size
1596
1700
1527
1509
Inexperienced teachers
0.11
0.10
0.12
0.11
Advanced degree teachers
0.53
0.59
0.49
0.50
New school
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00

Ungraded
Schools
(5)
440
449
0.38
0.27
0.24
0.39
0.43
0.27
0.75
0.28
86
53
426
0.28
0.30
0.21

School-year observations
355
119
236
694
715
Notes. This table reports weighted average characteristics of school-year observations. Specialized and
charter high schools admit applicants in a separate match and are considered screened and unscreened
schools, respectively. Panel A reports outcomes for cohorts enrolled in ninth grade in 2012-13, 201314 and 2014-15, and Panel B school characteristics in 2012-13, 2013-14 and 2014-15 by type of
school. A screened school is any school without unscreened programs. Graduation outcomes condition
on ninth grade enrollment in the year following the match and are available for the first and second
cohort only. Inexperienced teachers have 3 or fewer years of experience and advanced degree teachers a
Masters or higher degree.

Table 2. Student Characteristics
Ninth Grade Students
Eighth Grade Applicants in Match
Enrolled in
Listed
Enrolled in At Risk at
All
All
Grade A
Match A
Match A
Match A
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Demographics
Black
Hispanic
Female
Special education
English language learners
Free lunch
Baseline scores
Math (standardized)
English (standardized)
Offer rates
Grade A school
Grade A screened school
Grade A unscreened school
Listed Grade A first
9th grade enrollment
Grade A school
Grade A screened school
Grade A unscreened school

30.7
40.2
49.2
19.0
7.5
78.6

20.1
33.7
53.1
5.6
4.4
70

29.1
38.9
51.5
7.6
6.0
77.3

29.3
39.3
52.5
7.3
5.7
77.2

22.9
38.2
54.0
6.4
5.2
73.6

22.5
40.1
51.3
6.0
5.0
75.6

0.056
0.022

0.528
0.466

0.207
0.168

0.233
0.196

0.334
0.288

0.333
0.274

81.8
28.5
53.3
82.6

29.4
9.9
19.5
47.3

34.6
11.7
22.9
55.6

87.2
26.5
60.6
84.4

47.2
12.9
34.3
78.1

100
39.8
60.5

32.7
13.2
19.7

37.6
15.0
22.8

100
28.4
71.9

49.7
16.6
33.4

30.9
11.6
19.4

Students
182,249
48,985
153,107
130,160
40,301
30,760
Schools
603
569
174
567
159
532
School-year observations
1672
1584
355
1562
319
1420
Notes. This table describes the population of NYC students. Column 1 and 2 show statistics for students
enrolled in ninth grade in the 2012-13, 2013-14 and 2014-15 school years with non-missing demographics and
baseline test scores. Columns 3 to 6 show statistics for ninth grade applicants, who participated in the NYC high
school match one year earlier. A match A school is a Grade A school that participates in the main NYC high
school match. Students are said to have risk when they have a propensity score strictly between zero and one and
they're in a score cell with variation in Grade A school offers. Baseline scores are from sixth grade and
demographics from eighth grade.

Grade A listed first
# of screened Grade A
schools listed
# of unscreened Grade A
schools listed
Black
Hispanic
Female
Special education
English language learners
Free lunch
Baseline scores
Math (standardized)
English (standardized)

Table 3. Statistical Tests for Balance
All Applicants
Grade A Applicants with General Risk
Non-offered
Non-offered
Offer gap
Offer gap
mean
mean
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A. Application Covariates
0.393
0.761
0.483***
0.010*
(0.002)
(0.005)
1.11
1.19
0.533***
0.005
(0.011)
(0.006)
1.69
2.10
0.228***
-0.012
(0.008)
(0.017)
Panel B. Baseline Covariates
0.339
0.230
-0.130***
-0.003
(0.003)
(0.006)
0.405
0.402
-0.055***
0.005
(0.003)
(0.007)
0.527
0.517
0.003
0.002
(0.003)
(0.008)
0.078
0.061
-0.019***
-0.004
(0.001)
(0.004)
0.075
0.050
-0.014***
0.001
(0.001)
(0.004)
0.846
0.775
-0.100***
-0.009
(0.003)
(0.007)
0.110
0.081

0.379***
(0.005)
0.349***
(0.006)

0.284
0.219

0.006
(0.010)
0.007
(0.012)

N
130,160
30,760
Notes. This table reports balance statistics, computed by regressing covariates on dummies indicating a Grade A
offer and an ungraded school offer, controlling for saturated Grade A and ungraded school propensity scores
and running variable controls (column 4). The sample is limited to applicants with non-missing demographics
and baseline test scores. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%

Table 4. Grade A School 2SLS Estimates
All Applicants
Applicants with General Risk
Non-enrolled
Non-offered
OLS
2SLS
mean
mean
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A. First Stage Estimates
0.500
1.79***
(0.023)

SAT outcomes
(years of exposure)
Binary outcomes
(ever enrolled)

Panel B. Second Stage Estimates
474
6.48***
(106)
(0.152)

SAT Math
(200-800)
SAT Reading
(200-800)

473
(93)
N

5.39***
(0.138)
124,902

0.173

0.636***
(0.008)

515
(109)

2.23***
(0.716)

510
(93)

0.594
(0.657)
22,944

Graduated

0.697

0.038***
(0.003)

0.793

0.029**
(0.013)

College- and careerprepared

0.422

0.105***
(0.003)

0.587

0.095***
(0.015)

College-ready

0.367

0.075***
0.541
0.057***
(0.003)
(0.014)
N
120,716
19,202
Notes. This table reports estimates of the effects of Grade A high school enrollment. OLS
estimates are from models that omit propensity score controls and include all students in the
three match cohorts. 2SLS estimates are from models with dummies for Grade A and
ungraded schools treated as endogenous, limiting the sample to students with Grade A
assignment risk. All models include controls for baseline math and English scores, free
lunch status, SPED and ELL status, gender, and race/ethnicity indicators. Estimates in
column 4 are from models that include running variable controls. Robust standard errors are
in parenthesis for estimates and standard deviations for non-offered means. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

SAT Math
(200-800)
p-value
SAT Reading
(200-800)

Table 5. Multi-Sector Grade A 2SLS Estimates
OLS
2SLS Using General Risk
Screened Unscreened
Screened
Unscreened
Grade A
Grade A
Grade A
Grade A
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
18.8***
1.32***
2.91**
2.39***
(0.277)
(0.167)
(1.24)
(0.757)
0.690
15.9***
(0.252)

p-value
N
Graduated

0.987***
(0.153)

124,902
0.018***
(0.004)

0.035***
(0.003)

p-value
College- and careerprepared

0.112***
(0.004)

0.087***
(0.003)

0.103***
(0.004)

0.044***
(0.003)

p-value
College-ready

1.42
(1.14)

0.525
(0.697)

2SLS Using Lottery Risk
Screened Unscreened
Grade A
Grade A
(5)
(6)
1.86
2.05**
(2.81)
(0.885)
0.943
-0.900
(2.64)

0.451
24,943

0.614
(0.806)
0.561
13,097

0.048***
0.024
(0.018)
(0.015)
0.223

-0.017
(0.056)

0.024
(0.019)

0.086***
0.101***
(0.021)
(0.016)
0.503

0.167**
0.136***
(0.070)
(0.020)
0.662

0.467

0.107***
0.042***
0.018
0.051***
(0.021)
(0.015)
(0.067)
(0.019)
p-value
0.004
0.623
N
120,716
20,596
11,493
Notes. This table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for models that separately identify screened and unscreened Grade A effects.
OLS models omit propensity score controls and include all students in the three match cohorts. 2SLS models treat both sectors
as well as ungraded as endogenous, and limit the sample to students with either screened or unscreened Grade A assignment
risk. All models include baseline covariate controls, described in the notes to Table 4. Columns 3 and 4 include running variable
controls. P-values are from tests that screened and unscreened Grade A effects are equal in columns 3 and 4, and in columns 5
and 6, respectively. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 6. Marginal and Non-marginal Screened Grade A Effects
SAT Math
Graduation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Unscreened Grade A
2.39***
2.11**
2.42***
0.024
0.027
(0.757)
(0.842)
(0.760)
(0.015)
(0.016)
Screened Grade A

2.91**
(1.24)

2.59
(2.68)

0.048***
(0.018)

(6)
0.023
(0.015)

0.066
(0.047)

Screened Grade A Marginal (tc )

2.58**
(1.30)

0.047***
(0.018)

Screened Grade A Not marginal

1.91
(2.44)

0.071*
(0.040)

Instruments for
Screened Grade A

Screened
Grade A

Screened
Screened
Screened
Screened
Screened
Grade A × ta Grade A × ta
Grade A × ta Grade A × ta
Grade A
Screened
Screened
Grade A × tc
Grade A × tc
N
24,943
19,685
24,887
20,596
16,147
20,554
Notes. Columns 1 and 4 repeat estimates from columns 3 and 4 in Table 5. Estimates in columns 2 and 5 are from
models that instrument screened attendance with a dummy indicating receipt of screened Grade A offer for
applicants inframarginal (ta ) at the school where the offer was received. Columns 3 and 6 report 2SLS estimates
that allow screened Grade A effects to differ for marginal (tc ) applicants at the school where the offer was
received and non-marginal applicants. Non-marginal applicants include inframarginal applicants (ta ) and students
who enrolled in a Screened Grade A school for which they did not receive an offer. The sample here includes
applicants with either Grade A unscreened school or Grade A screened school assignment risk, and with
assignment risk for any of the instruments used in each model. All models include propensity score controls,
running variable controls, and the covariates used as controls for Table 5. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

A
A.1

Proofs
Proposition 1

When t = n, Ri > τA + δ for sufficiently small δ > 0, and hence 1(Ri ≤ τA ) = 0. This implies
lim E[1(Ri ≤ τA )|θi = θ, tiA (δ) = n, Wi = w] = 0.

δ→0

When t = a, Ri ≤ τA − δ for sufficiently small δ > 0, and hence 1(Ri ≤ τA ) = 1. This implies
lim E[1(Ri ≤ τA )|θi = θ, tiA (δ) = a, Wi = w] = 1.

δ→0

Finally, when t = c, we have:
lim E[1(Ri ≤ τA )|θi = θ, tiA (δ) = c, Wi = w]

δ→0

P (τA − δ < Ri ≤ τA |θi = θ, Wi = w)
P (τA − δ < Ri ≤ τA + δ|θi = θ, Wi = w)
FR (τA |θ, w) − FR (τA − δ|θ, w)
= lim
δ→0 FR (τA + δ|θ, w) − FR (τA − δ|θ, w)
{FR (τA |θ, w) − FR (τA − δ|θ, w)}/δ
= lim
δ→0 {FR (τA + δ|θ, w) − FR (τA |θ, w)}/δ + {FR (τA |θ, w) − FR (τA − δ|θ, w)}/δ
F 0 (τA |θ, w)
= R0
= 0.5,
2FR (τA |θ, w)
= lim

δ→0

where the last equality uses Assumption 1(a), which states FR0 (τA |θ, w) 6= 0. The second-to(x)
x→a f (x)
last equality is a consequence of the limit laws; e.g., limx→a fg(x)
= lim
limx→a g(x) provided that
limx→a g(x) 6= 0.

A.2

Proposition 4

We prove Proposition 4 using a similar strategy as the proof of Theorem 1 in Abdulkadiroğlu
et al. (2017b). Note first that admissions cutoffs ξ in a continuum market do not depend on
the realized tie-breakers Ri s and bandwidth δ: DA in the continuum depends on the Ri s only
through G(I0 ), the fraction of applicants in set I0 = {i ∈ I | θi ∈ Θ0 , riv ≤ rv for all v} with
various choices of Θ0 and r. In particular, G(I0 ) doesn’t depend on tie-breaker realizations in
the continuum market. For the empirical CDF of each tie-breaker conditional on each type,
F̂v (·|θ), the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem for independent but non-identically distributed random
variables implies F̂v (·|θ) = Fv (·|θ) for any v and θ (Wellner, 1981). G(I0 ) also doesn’t depend
on reference tie-breaker r and bandwidth δ since they affect only the distribution of a single
student i’s tie-breaker Ri , which has no effect on G(I0 ) or cutoffs. Since cutoffs ξ are constant,
marginal priority ρs is also constant for every school s.
Now, consider the propensity score for school s. First, applicants who don’t rank s have
ps (θ) = 0. If θ ∈ Θns , then ρθs > ρs . Therefore,
ps (θ) = 0 if θ ∈ Θns ∪ (Θ\Θs ).
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Second, if θ ∈ Θas ∪ Θcs , then the type θ applicant may be assigned a more preferred school
s̃ ∈ Bθs , where ρθs̃ = ρs̃ . For each tie-breaker v, the proportion of type θ applicants assigned
v where ρ
v
some s̃ ∈ Bθs
θs̃ = ρs̃ is Fv (M IDθs |θ). This means for each v, the probability of not
v where ρ = ρ is 1−F (M ID v |θ). Since tie-breakers are assumed to
being assigned any s̃ ∈ Bθs
s̃
v
θs̃
θs
be distributed independently of one another, the probability of not being assigned any s̃ ∈ Bθs
v |θ)). Every applicant of type θ ∈ Θa
where ρθs̃ = ρs̃ for a type θ applicant is Πv (1 − Fv (M IDθs
s
who is not assigned a more preferred choice is assigned s because ρθs < ρs , and so
v
ps (θ) = Πv (1 − Fv (M IDθs
|θ)) if θ ∈ Θas .

Finally, consider applicants of type θ ∈ Θcs who are not assigned a more preferred choice than
s. The fraction of applicants θ ∈ Θcs who are not assigned a more preferred choice is Πv (1 −
v |θ)). Also, the values of the tie-breaking variable v(s) of these applicants are larger
Fv (M IDθs
v(s)
v(s)
v(s)
than M IDθs . If τs < M IDθs , then no such applicant is assigned s. If τs ≥ M IDθs , then
v(s)

the fraction of applicants who are assigned s within this set is given by

Fv(s) (τs |θ)−Fv(s) (M IDθs |θ)
v(s)

1−Fv(s) (M IDθs |θ)

.

Hence, conditional on θ ∈ Θcs and not being assigned a choice higher than s, the probability of
v(s)

being assigned s is given by max{0,
ps (θ) =

Y

Fv(s) (τs |θ)−Fv(s) (M IDθs |θ)
v(s)
1−Fv(s) (M IDθs |θ)

}. Therefore,

n
o
v(s)
v
(1 − Fv (M IDθs
|θ)) × max 0, Fv(s) (τs |θ) − Fv(s) (M IDθs |θ) if θ ∈ Θcs .

v6=v(s)

Note that when v(s) = 0, we have the lottery tie-breaker. In that case, Fv(s) (τs |θ) = τs and
v(s)

0 .
Fv(s) (M IDθs |θ) = M IDθs

A.3

Theorem 1

Take any continuum market with the general tie-breaking structure in Section 3. For each
δ > 0 and each tie-breaker v = 2, ..., V + 1, let e(v) be short-hand notation for “θi = θ, Riu >
u for u = 1, ..., v − 1, T (δ) = T, and W = w." Similarly, e(1) is short-hand notation for
M IDθs
i
i
“θi = θ, Ti (δ) = T, and Wi = w." Let ψs (θ, T, δ, w) ≡ E[Di (s)|e(1)] be assignment risk for an
applicant with θi = θ, Ti (δ) = T, and characteristics Wi = w. Our proofs use a lemma that
describes this assignment risk. To state the lemma, for v > 0, let

v
v

 Fv (M IDθs |e(v)) − Fv (M IDθs − δ|e(v)) if tb (δ) = c for some b ∈ B v
θs
v + δ|e(v)) − F (M ID v − δ|e(v))
Φδ (v) ≡ Fv (M IDθs
v
θs

1
otherwise.
0
We use this object to define Φδ ≡ (1 − M IDθs
)ΠVv=1 Φδ (v). Finally, let



Fv(s) (τs |e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))


max
0,
if v(s) > 0

Fv(s) (τs + δ|e(V
+ 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))
0


Φδ ≡
0
τs − M IDθs


max 0,
if v(s) = 0.
0
1 − M IDθs
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Lemma 1. In the general tie-breaking setting of Section 3, for any fixed δ > 0 such that
v |, we have:
δ < minθ,s,v |τs − M IDθ,s


 0
ψs (θ, T, δ, w) =
Φδ

 Φ × Φ0
δ
δ

if ts (δ) = n or tb (δ) = a for some b ∈ Bθs ,
otherwise and ts (δ) = a,
otherwise and ts (δ) = c.

Proof of Lemma 1. We start verifying the first line in ψs (θ, T, δ, w). Applicants who don’t list
s have ψs (θ, T, δ, w) = 0. Among those who list s, those of ts (δ) = n have θ ∈ Θns or, if v(s) 6=
0, θ ∈ Θcs and Riv(s) > τs + δ. If θ ∈ Θns , then ρθs > ρs so that ψs (θ, T, δ, w) = 0. Even if
θ 6∈ Θns , as long as θ ∈ Θcs and Riv(s) > τs + δ, student i never clears the cutoff at school s so
ψs (θ, T, δ, w) = 0.
To show the remaining cases, take as given that it is not the case that ts (δ) = n or tb (δ) =
a for some b ∈ Bθs . Applicants with tb (δ) 6= a for all b ∈ Bθs and ts (δ) = a or c may be assigned
b ∈ Bθs , where ρθb = ρb . Since the (aggregate) distribution of tie-breaking variables for type
θ students is F̂v (·|θ) = Fv (·|θ), conditional on Ti (δ) = T , the proportion of type θ applicants
0 )Π Φ (v) since each Φ (v) is the
not assigned any b ∈ Bθs where ρθb = ρb is Φδ = (1 − M IDθs
v δ
δ
v . To see why Φ (v) is the probability of not being
probability of not being assigned to any b ∈ Bθs
δ
v , note that if t (δ) 6= c for all b ∈ B v , then t (δ) = n for all b ∈ B v so
assigned to any b ∈ Bθs
b
b
θs
θs
v
v ,
that applicants are never assigned to any b ∈ Bθs . Otherwise, i.e., if tb (δ) = c for some b ∈ Bθs
then applicants are assigned to s if and only if their values of tie-breaker v clear the cutoff of
v , where applicants have t (δ) = c. This event happens with
the school that produces M IDθs
s
probability
v |e(v)) − F (M ID v − δ|e(v))
Fv (M IDθs
v
θs
v
v − δ|e(v)) ,
Fv (M IDθs + δ|e(v)) − Fv (M IDθs
v .
implying that Φδ (v) is the probability of not being assigned to any b ∈ Bθs
Given this fact, to see the second line, note that every applicant of type ts (δ) = a who is not
assigned a higher choice is assigned s for sure because ρθs < ρs or ρθs + Riv(s) < ξs . Therefore,
we have
ψs (θ, T, δ, w) = Φδ .

Finally, consider applicants with ts (δ) = c. The fraction of those who are not assigned a
higher choice is Φδ , as explained above. Also, for tie-breaker v(s), the tie-breaker values of
v(s)
v(s)
these applicants are larger (worse) than M IDθs . If τs < M IDθs , then no such applicant is
v(s)
assigned s. If τs ≥ M IDθs , then the fraction of applicants who are assigned s conditional on
v(s)
τs ≥ M IDθs is given by
(
max 0,

v(s)

Fv(s) (τs |e(V + 1)) − max{Fv(s) (M IDθs |e(V + 1)), Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))}
v(s)

Fv(s) (τs + δ|e(V + 1)) − max{Fv(s) (M IDθs |e(V + 1)), Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))}
and


0 
τs − M IDθs
max 0,
if v(s) = 0.
0
1 − M IDθs
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)
if v(s) 6= 0

v(s)

v(s)

v | implies M ID
If M IDθs < τs , then δ < minθ,s,v |τs − M IDθ,s
θs < τs − δ. This in turn implies
v(s)

max{Fv(s) (M IDθs |e(V + 1)), Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))} = Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1)).
v(s)

v(s)

v | implies M ID
If M IDθs > τs , then δ < minθ,s,v |τs − M IDθ,s
θs > τs + δ. By the definition of
v(s)

u for u = 1, ..., V . Therefore, there is no applicant with R
e(V + 1), Riu > M IDθs
iv(s) > M IDθs
and Riv(s) ∈ [τs − δ, τs + δ].
Hence, conditional on ts (δ) = c and not being assigned a choice more preferred than s, the
probability of being assigned s is given by Φ0δ . Therefore, for students with ts (δ) = c, we have
ψs (θ, T, δ, w) = Φδ × Φ0δ .

Lemma 2. In the general tie-breaking setting of Section 3, for all s, θ, and sufficiently small
δ > 0, we have:

ψs (θ, T, δ, w) =


0





Φ∗δ





∗

 Φδ ×













if ts (0) = n or tb (0) = a for some b ∈ Bθs ,
otherwise and ts (0) = a,
Fv(s) (τs |e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))
Fv(s) (τs + δ|e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))
otherwise and ts (0) = c and v(s) 6= 0.
0
τs − M IDθs
Φ∗δ × max{0,
}
0
1 − M IDθs
otherwise and ts (0) = c and v(s) = 0.

(17)

where

v
v

 Fv (M IDθs + δ|e(v)) − Fv (M IDθs |e(v)) if M IDv = τb and tb = c for some b ∈ B v ,
θs
θs
v
v
Φ∗δ (v) ≡ Fv (M IDθs + δ|e(v)) − Fv (M IDθs − δ|e(v))

1
otherwise
and
0
Φ∗δ ≡ (1 − M IDθs
)ΠVv=1 Φ∗δ (v).

Proof of Lemma 2. The first line follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that ts (0) = n or tb (0) =
a for some b ∈ Bθs imply ts (δ) = n or tb (δ) = a for some b ∈ Bθs for sufficiently small δ > 0.
For the remaining lines, first note that conditional on ts (0) 6= n and tb (0) 6= a for all b ∈ Bθs ,
we have Φ∗δ (v) = Φδ (v) and so Φ∗δ = Φδ holds for small enough δ. Φ∗δ therefore is the probability
of not being assigned to a school preferred to s in the last three cases.
The second line is then by the fact that ts (0) = a implies ts (δ) = a for small enough δ > 0.
The third line is by the fact that for small enough δ > 0,


Fv(s) (τs |e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))
0
Φδ = max 0,
Fv(s) (τs + δ|e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))
=

Fv(s) (τs |e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))
,
Fv(s) (τs + δ|e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))
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v 6= τ . The last line directly follows
where we invoke Assumption 1(b), which implies M IDθs
s
from Lemma 1.

We use Lemma 2 to derive Theorem 1. We characterize limδ→0 ψs (θ, T, δ, w) and show that it
coincides with ψs (θ, T ) in the main text. In the first case in Lemma 2, ψs (θ, T, δ, w) is constant
(0) for any small enough δ. The constant value is also limδ→0 ψs (θ, T, δ, w) in this case.
To characterize limδ→0 ψs (θ, T, δ, w) in the remaining cases, note that by the differentiability
of Fv (·|e(v)) (recall Assumption 1), L’Hopital’s rule implies:
0 (τ |e(V + 1))
Fv(s)
Fv(s) (τs |e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))
s
lim
=
= 0.5
0
δ→0 Fv(s) (τs + δ|e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))
2Fv(s) (τs |e(V + 1))

and

v + δ|e(v)) − F (M ID v |e(v))
v |e(v))
Fv (M IDθs
Fv0 (M IDθs
v
θs
=
v + δ|e(v)) − F (M ID v − δ|e(v))
v |e(v)) = 0.5.
δ→0 Fv (M IDθs
2Fv0 (M IDθs
v
θs

lim

v

v

v = τ and t =
This implies limδ→0 Φ∗δ (v) = 0.51{M IDθs =τb and tb =c for some b∈Bθs } since 1{M IDθs
b
b
v } does not depend on δ. Therefore
c for some b ∈ Bθs
0
lim Φ∗δ = (1 − M IDθs
)0.5ms (θ,T )

δ→0

v = τ and t = c for some b ∈ B v }|.
where ms (θ, T ) = |{v > 0 : M IDθs
b
b
θs
Combining these limiting facts with the fact that the limit of a product of functions equals
the product of the limits of the functions, we obtain the following: limδ→0 ψs (θ, T, δ, w) = 0 if
(a) ts = n or (b) tb = a for some b ∈ Bθs . Otherwise,

m (θ,T ) (1 − M ID 0 )

if ts (0) = a
 0.5 s
θs

0
lim ψs (θ, T, δ, w) =
0.5ms (θ,T ) max 0, τs − M IDθs
if ts (0) = c and v(s) = 0

δ→0
 0.51+ms (θ,T ) (1 − M ID0 )
if ts (0) = c and v(s) > 0.
θs

This expression coincides with ψs (θ, T ), completing the proof of Theorem 1.

A.4

Theorem 2

Here we prove the following lemmas used in the proof of Theorem 2 in the main text.
a.s.
Lemma 3. (Cutoff almost sure convergence) ξˆN −→ ξ where ξ denotes the vector of continuum
market cutoffs.

Lemma 4. (Estimated local propensity score almost sure convergence) For all θ ∈ Θ, s ∈ S, and
a.s.
T ∈ {a, c, n}S , we have ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) −→ ψs (θ, T ) as N → ∞ and δN → 0.
Lemma 5. (Bandwidth-specific propensity score almost sure convergence) For all θ ∈ Θ, s ∈ S,
p
T ∈ {a, c, n}S , and δN such that δN → 0 and N δN → ∞ as N → ∞, we have ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) −→
ψs (θ, T ) as N → ∞.
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Proof of Lemma 3
The proof of Lemma 3 is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3 in Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017b)
and available upon request. The main difference is that to deal with multiple non-lottery tiebreakers, the proof of Lemma 3 needs to invoke Assumption 1 and the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem
for independent but non-identically distributed random variables (Wellner, 1981).
Proof of Lemma 4
ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) is almost everywhere continuous in finite sample cutoffs ξˆN , finite sample MIDs
v ), and bandwidth δ . Since every M ID v is almost everywhere continuous in finite
(M IDθs
N
θs
ˆ
sample cutoffs ξN , ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) is almost everywhere continuous in finite sample cutoffs ξˆN
a.s.
and bandwidth δN . Recall δN → 0 by assumption while ξˆN −→ ξ by Lemma 3. Therefore,
by the continuous mapping theorem, as N → ∞, ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) almost surely converges to
ψ̂N s (θ, T ; δN ) with ξ replacing ξˆN , which is ψs (θ, T ).
Proof of Lemma 5
We use the following fact, which is implied by Example 19.29 in van der Vaart (2000).
Lemma 6. Let X be a random variable distributed according to some CDF F over [0, 1]. Let
F (·|X ∈ [x − δ, x + δ]) be the conditional version of F conditional on X being in a small window
[x − δ, x + δ] where x ∈ [0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1]. Let X1 , ..., XN be iid draws from F . Let F̂N be
the empirical CDF of X1 , ..., XN . Let F̂N (·|X ∈ [x − δ, x + δ]) be the conditional version of F̂N
conditional on a subset of draws falling in [x − δ, x + δ], i.e., {Xi |i = 1, ..., n, Xi ∈ [x − δ, x + δ]}.
Suppose (δN ) is a sequence with δN ↓ 0 and δN × N → ∞. Then F̂N (·|X ∈ [x − δN , x + δN ])
uniformly converges to F (·|X ∈ [x − δN , x + δN ]), i.e.,
sup |F̂N (x0 |X ∈ [x − δN , x + δN ]) − F (x0 |X ∈ [x − δN , x + δN ])| →p 0 as N → ∞ and δN → 0.

x0 ∈[0,1]

Proof of Lemma 6. We first prove the statement for x ∈ (0, 1). Let P be the probability measure
of X and P̂N be the empirical measure of X1 , ..., XN . Note that
sup |F̂N (x0 |X ∈ [x − δN , x + δN ]) − F (x0 |X ∈ [x − δN , x + δN ])|

x0 ∈[0,1]

= sup |F̂N (x + tδN |X ∈ [x − δN , x + δN ]) − F (x + tδN |X ∈ [x − δN , x + δN ])|
t∈[−1,1]

= sup |
t∈[−1,1]

=

P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ]
P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ]
1

−

PX [x − δN , x + tδN ]
|
PX [x − δN , x + δN ]

P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ]PX [x − δN , x + δN ]
× sup |P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ]PX [x − δN , x + δN ] − P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ]PX [x − δN , x + tδN ]|
t∈[−1,1]
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=

1
P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ]PX [x − δN , x + δN ]
× sup |P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ](PX [x − δN , x + δN ] − P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ])
t∈[−1,1]

≤

+ P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ](P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ] − PX [x − δN , x + tδN ])|
1
P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ]PX [x − δN , x + δN ]
× { sup P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ]|P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ] − PX [x − δN , x + δN ]|
t∈[−1,1]

+ sup P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ]|P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ] − PX [x − δN , x + tδN ]|}
t∈[−1,1]

=

1
PX [x − δN , x + δN ]
× {|P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ] − PX [x − δN , x + δN ]| + sup |P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ] − PX [x − δN , x + tδN ]|}
t∈[−1,1]

=

AN
,
PX [x − δN , x + δN ]

where
AN = |P̂N [x−δN , x+δN ]−PX [x−δN , x+δN ]|+ sup |P̂N [x−δN , x+tδN ]−PX [x−δN , x+tδN ]|.
t∈[−1,1]

The above inequality holds by the triangle inequality and the second last equality holds because
supt∈[−1,1] P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ] = P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ].
p

We show that AN /PX [x − δN , x + δN ] −→ 0. Example 19.29 in van der Vaart (2000) implies
p
that the sequence of processes { n/δN (P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ] − PX [x − δN , x + tδN ]) : t ∈ [−1, 1]}
converges in distribution to a Gaussian process in the space of bounded functions on [−1, 1] as
N → ∞. We denote this Gaussian process by {Gt : t ∈ [−1, 1]}. We then use the continuous
mapping theorem to obtain
p
d
n/δN AN −→ |G1 | + sup |Gt |
t∈[−1,1]

as N → ∞. Since {Gt : t ∈ [−1, 1]} has bounded sample paths, it follows that |G1 | < ∞ and
supt∈[−1,1] |Gt | < ∞ for sure. By the continuous mapping theorem, under the condition that
N δN → ∞,
p
p
(1/δN )AN = (1/ N δN ) × n/δN AN
d

−→ 0 × (|G1 | + sup |Gt |)
t∈[−1,1]

= 0.
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p

This implies that (1/δN )AN −→ 0, because for any  > 0,
Pr(|(1/δN )AN | > ) = Pr((1/δN )AN < −) + Pr((1/δN )AN > )
≤ Pr((1/δN )AN ≤ −) + 1 − Pr((1/δN )AN ≤ )
→ Pr(0 ≤ −) + 1 − Pr(0 ≤ )
= 0,
p

d

where the convergence holds since (1/δN )AN −→ 0. To show that AN /PX [x − δN , x + δN ] −→ 0,
it is therefore enough to show that limN →∞ (1/δN )PX [x − δN , x + δN ] > 0. We have
(1/δN )PX [x − δN , x + δN ] = (1/δN )(FX (x + δN ) − FX (x − δN ))
= (1/δN )(2f (x)δN + o(δN ))
= 2f (x) + o(1)
→ 2f (x)
> 0,
where we use Taylor’s theorem for the second equality and the assumption of f (x) > 0 for the
last inequality.
We next prove the statement for x = 0. Note that
sup |F̂N (x0 |X ∈ [−δN , δN ]) − F (x0 |X ∈ [−δN , δN ])|

x0 ∈[0,1]

= sup |F̂N (tδN |X ∈ [0, δN ]) − F (tδN |X ∈ [0, δN ])|
t∈[0,1]

= sup |
t∈[0,1]

F̂N (tδN )
F̂N (δN )
1

−

FX (tδN )
|
FX (δN )

sup |F̂N (tδN )FX (δN ) − F̂N (δN )FX (tδN )|
F̂N (δN )FX (δN ) t∈[0,1]
1
=
sup |F̂N (tδN )(FX (δN ) − F̂N (δN )) + F̂N (δN )(F̂N (tδN ) − FX (tδN ))|
F̂N (δN )FX (δN ) t∈[0,1]
1
≤
{ sup F̂N (tδN )|F̂N (δN ) − FX (δN )| + sup F̂N (δN )|F̂N (tδN ) − FX (tδN )|}
F̂N (δN )FX (δN ) t∈[0,1]
t∈[0,1]
=

=

A0N
1
{|F̂N (δN ) − FX (δN )| + sup |F̂N (tδN ) − FX (tδN )|} =
,
FX (δN )
FX (δN )
t∈[0,1]

where A0N = |F̂N (δN ) − FX (δN )| + supt∈[0,1] |F̂N (tδN ) − FX (tδN )|. By the argument used in the
p

above proof for x ∈ (0, 1), we have (1/δN )A0N −→ 0. It also follows that
(1/δN )FX (δN ) = (1/δN )(f (0)δN + o(δN ))
= f (0) + o(1)
→ f (0)
> 0.
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p

p

Thus, FX (δNN ) −→ 0, and hence supx0 ∈[0,1] |F̂N (x0 |X ∈ [−δN , δN ]) − F (x0 |X ∈ [−δN , δN ])| −→ 0.
The proof for x = 1 follows from the same argument.
Consider any deterministic sequence of economies {gN } such that gN ∈ G for all N and
gN → G in the (G, d) metric space. Let (δN ) be an associated sequence of positive numbers
(bandwidths) such that δN → 0 and N δN → ∞ as N → ∞. Let ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) ≡ EN [Di (s)|θi =
θ, Ti (δN ) = T ] be the (finite-market, deterministic) bandwidth-specific propensity score for
particular gN and δN .
For Lemma 5, it is enough to show deterministic convergence of this finite-market score, that
is, ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) → ψs (θ, T ) as gN → G and δN → 0. To see this, let GN be the distribution
over I(Θ0 , r0 , r1 )’s induced by randomly drawing N applicants from G. Note that GN is random
a.s.
and that GN → G by Wellner (1981)’s Glivenko-Cantelli theorem for independent but nonp
identically distributed random variables. GN → G and ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) → ψs (θ, T ) allow us to
apply the Extended Continuous Mapping Theorem (Theorem 18.11 in van der Vaart (2000)) to
p
obtain ψ̃N s (θ, T ; δN ) −→ ψs (θ, T ) where ψ̃N s (θ, T ; δN ) is the random version of ψN s (θ, T ; δN )
defined for GN .
For notational simplicity, consider the single-school RD case analyzed in Proposition 1, where
there is only one school s making offers based on a single non-lottery tie-breaker v(s) (without
using any priority). A similar argument with additional notation shows the result for DA with
general tie-breaking.
For any δN > 0, whenever Ti (δN ) = a, it is the case that Di (s) = 1. As a result,
ψN s (θ, a; δN ) ≡ EN [Di (s)|θi = θ, Ti (δN ) = a] = 1 ≡ ψs (θ, a).
Therefore, ψN s (θ, a; δN ) → ψs (θ, a) as N → ∞. Similarly, for any δN > 0, whenever Ti (δN ) = n,
it is the case that Di (s) = 0. As a result,
ψN s (θ, n; δN ) ≡ EN [Di (s)|θi = θ, Ti (δN ) = n] = 0 ≡ ψs (θ, n).
Therefore, ψN s (θ, n; δN ) → ψs (θ, n) as N → ∞. Finally, when Ti (δN ) = c, let
PN
FN,v(s) (r|θ) ≡

i
i=1 1{θi = θ}Fv(s) (r)
PN
i=1 1{θi = θ}

be the aggregate tie-breaker distribution conditional on each applicant type θ in the finite market.
As in the proof of Lemma 3, ξ˜N s denotes the random cutoff at school s in a realized economy
gN . For any , there exists N0 such that for any N > N0 , we have
ψN s (θ, c; δN ) ≡ EN [Di (s)|θi = θ, Ti (δN ) = c]
= PN [Riv(s) ≤ ξ˜N s |θi = θ, Riv(s) ∈ (ξ˜N s − δN , ξ˜N s + δN ]]
∈ (P [Riv(s) ≤ ξs |θi = θ, Riv(s) ∈ (ξs − δN , ξs + δN ]] − /2,
P [Riv(s) ≤ ξs |θi = θ, Riv(s) ∈ (ξs − δN , ξs + δN ]] + /2),
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where ξs is school s’s continuum cutoff, P is the probability induced by the tie-breaker distributions in the continuum economy, and the inclusion is by Assumption 1 and Lemmata 3 and
6. Again for any , there exists N0 such that for any N > N0 , we have
(P [Riv(s) ≤ ξs |θi = θ, Riv(s) ∈ (ξs − δN , ξs + δN ]] − /2,
P [Riv(s) ≤ ξs |θi = θ, Riv(s) ∈ (ξs − δN , ξs + δN ]] + /2)
=(

Fv(s) (ξs |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)
− /2,
Fv(s) (ξs + δN |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)
Fv(s) (ξs |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)
+ /2)
Fv(s) (ξs + δN |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)

=(

{Fv(s) (ξs |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)}/δN
− /2,
{Fv(s) (ξs + δN |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs |θ)}/δN + {Fv(s) (ξs |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)}/δN
{Fv(s) (ξs |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)}/δN
+ /2)
{Fv(s) (ξs + δN |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs |θ)}/δN + {Fv(s) (ξs |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)}/δN

∈ (0.5 − , 0.5 + )
= (ψs (θ, c) − , ψs (θ, c) + ),
completing the proof.
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B

Running Variables Coded as Ranks

Rank transformation of independent tie-breakers can induce dependence. This section shows
that tie-breakers transformed into ranks become independent as the number of students grows
to infinity. The assumption of independent tie-breakers therefore holds for a continuum market
as long as the underlying tie-breakers are independent. Let (X1 , X2 , . . .) be a sequence of
independent random variables. Define the rank function as follows.
N
1 X
rankN (t) =
1{Xi < t}.
N
i=1

Let

N
1 X
FN (t) =
P (Xi < t).
N
i=1

Proposition 5. For all k, we have
rankN (Xk ) − FN (Xk ) → 0

a.s.

Thus the process (rankN (Xk ) : k ∈ N) converges to the independent sequence (FN (Xk ) : k ∈ N)
uniformly in k on a set of measure 1.
Proof of Proposition 5. We prove Proposition 5 using a few lemmas below.
Lemma 7 (Hoeffding’s maximal inequality; Lemma 5.1 in van Handel (2016)). Let A be a finite
N and write kAk = sup
subset of Rp
a∈A kak2 , where || · ||2 is the square root of the sum of squares
2
2
2
(||x||2 ≡
x1 + ... + xm for any vector x ≡ (x1 , ..., xm )). Let X1 , . . . , XN be independent,
centered (mean zero) random variables supported on [−1, 1]. Then we have
(N
)
X
p
E sup
ai Xi ≤ kAk2 2 log |A|,
a∈A

i=1

where |A| is the cardinality of set A.
Lemma 8. The expected supremum of the rank process satisfies
(
) r
N
1 X
8 log(n + 1)
E sup
(1{Xi < t} − P (Xi < t))
≤
.
N
n
t∈R
i=1

Proof of Lemma 8. Let ft (s) = 1{s < t}. For each k, construct an independent random variable
Yk with the same distribution as Xk . Note that (i) E[ft (Yk )] = P (Xk < t) and (ii) the law of
ft (Xk ) − ft (Yk ) is symmetric around 0. By Jensen’s inequality, we have
(
)
(
)
N
N
1 X
1 X
E sup
(ft (Xi ) − P (Xi < t))
≤ E sup
(ft (Xi ) − ft (Yi ))
.
N
N
t∈R
t∈R
i=1

i=1
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By symmetry and independence of the summands, their joint distribution does not change if
we multiply each by an independent random variable εk that is uniformly distributed on {±1}.
This gives us
(
)
(
)
N
N

1 X
1 X
E sup
(ft (Xi ) − ft (Yi ))
= E sup
εi ft (Xi ) − ft (Yi )
N
N
t∈R
t∈R
i=1
i=1
"
(
)
(
)#
N
N
1 X
1 X
≤ E sup
εi ft (Xi )
+ sup
−εi ft (Yi )
N
N
t∈R
t∈R
i=1
i=1
(
)
N
1 X
= 2 · E sup
εi ft (Xi )
N
t∈R
i=1

We then have
(
2 · E sup
t∈R

N
1 X
εi ft (Xi )
N

)

" "

(

= 2 · E E sup
t∈R

i=1

" "

(

= 2 · E E sup
t∈R

N
1 X
εi ft (Xi )
N

1
N

i=1
N
X

)

##
X1 , . . . , XN

)
εi ft (X(i) )

##
X1 , . . . , XN

.

i=1

Here X(i) refers to the ith smallest element of {X1 , . . . , XN }; we use the fact that the inner sum
is invariant to re-ordering. As t ∈ R varies, the vector
ut (X1 , . . . , XN ) =

1
1
N ft (X(1) ), . . . , N ft (X(N ) )



√
takes on at most n + 1 values, and we always have ||ut ||2 ≤ 1/ N . This follows from observing
that nut takes values in the set of increasing binary sequences of length N . Applying Lemma 7
to the inner expectation then gives
" "
(
)
## r
N
1 X
8 log(N + 1)
2 · E E sup
εi ft (X(i) )
X1 , . . . , XN
≤
.
N
N
t∈R
i=1

Lemma 9. Write
(
h(X1 , . . . , XN ) = sup
t∈R

N
1 X
(1{Xi < t} − P (Xi < t))
N

)
.

i=1

2

Then P |h(X1 , . . . , XN ) − E[h(X1 , . . . , XN )]| > δ) ≤ e−2N δ .
Proof of Lemma 9. Note that varying Xi (ω) can change h(ω) by at most 1/n, for all ω in the
sample space. Lemma 9 then follows from McDiarmid’s inequality as stated in van Handel
(2016) (Theorem 3.11).
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Combining Lemmas 8 and 9, we obtain
(
) r
!
N
1 X
8 log(N + 1)
P sup
(1{Xi < t} − P (Xi < t))
≥
+δ
N
N
t∈R
i=1

(
≤P

sup
t∈R

N
1 X
(1{Xi < t} − P (Xi < t))
N

)

(


≥ E sup
t∈R

i=1

≤ e−2N δ

N
1 X
(1{Xi < t} − P (Xi < t))
N

)

i=1

2

Since the sequence on the right-hand side is summable for any fixed δ, we apply the Borel-Cantelli
lemma to obtain
(
)
!
N
1 X
P lim sup sup
(1{Xi < t} − P (Xi < t))
≥ δ = 0.
N
N →∞ t∈R
i=1

Taking δ → 0 gives
(
lim sup sup
N →∞

t∈R

N
1 X
(1{Xi < t} − P (Xi < t))
N

)
=0

a.s.

i=1

This implies that
rankN (Xk ) − FN (Xk ) ≤ sup

n

t∈R

completing the proof of Proposition 5.
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rankN (t) − FN (t)

o

↓0

a.s.,

]+δ

!

C
C.1

Empirical Appendix
Additional Results

Table A1 reports estimates of the effect of Grade A offers on attrition, computed by estimating
models like those used to gauge balance. Under general risk, applicants who receive Grade A
school offers have a slightly higher likelihood of taking the SAT. Decomposing Grade A schools
into screened and unscreened schools, applicants who receive unscreened Grade A school offers
are 1.7 percent more likely to have SAT scores, while offers to Grade A screened schools do
not correspond to a statistically significant difference in the likelihood of having follow-up SAT
scores. This modest difference seems unlikely to bias the 2SLS Grade A estimates reported in
Tables 4 and 5.
Table A2 reports estimates of the effect of enrollment in an ungraded high school. These use
models like those used to compute the estimates presented in Table 4. OLS estimates show a
small positive effect of ungraded school attendance on SAT scores and a strong negative effect
on graduation outcomes. 2SLS estimates, by contrast, suggest ungraded school attendance is
unrelated to these outcomes.

C.2

Bandwidth Computation and Robustness Checks

Bandwidths are estimated as suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), separately for each
screened program that has applicants on both sides of the cutoff. Bandwidths are estimated
for the set of applicants who are in the relevant marginal priority group. Bandwidths are also
computed separately for each outcome variable. Estimates reported in the text use the smallest
of these.
The robustness of this procedure is evaluated by comparing the results generated under
alternative restrictions on the distribution of tie-breakers and bandwidth size. Estimates in
column 2 of Table A3 are from a model that ignores general risk stemming from screened
programs with four or more duplicate tie-breaker values in the estimated bandwidth, resulting
in modest changes in sample and effect size. Estimates in column 3 are from a model that
ignores general risk stemming from screened programs with any gap of four or more in tiebreaker positions within the estimated bandwidth. Columns 4 and 5 show results that combine
these restrictions, reducing the sample of applicants with general risk by 17 and 31 percent,
respectively. The restrictions leave effect size and precision largely unchanged.
Table A4 reports 2SLS estimates computed using alternative bandwidths. Halving the bandwidth size at screened programs reduces the sample of applicants with general risk by about
20 percent, while doubling of bandwidth size increases sample size by about 20 percent. The
estimates in column 4 are from regressions that use sixth grade baseline scores instead of SAT
and graduation outcomes when computing the bandwidth. These variations leave the magnitude
and precision of Grade A school effects mostly unchanged.
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Took SAT exam

Table A1. Differential Attrition
General Risk
Non-offered
Grade A School
mean
Any
Screened Unscreened
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.761
0.018***
-0.002
0.017**
(0.007)
(0.012)
(0.007)
N
30,760
10,497
25,918

Lottery Risk
Any
Grade A
(5)
0.021**
(0.008)
18,743

0.635

Has binary outcomes
(Enrolled in ninth grade)

0.003*
0.003
0.002
0.003
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
N
30,760
10,497
25,918
18,743
Notes. This table reports differential attrition estimates, computed by regressing covariates on dummies
indicating a Grade A offer and an ungraded school offer, controlling for saturated Grade A and
ungraded school propensity scores (columns 2-5), and running variable controls (columns 2-4). Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

SAT Math
(200-800)

Table A2. Ungraded School 2SLS Estimates
All applicants
Applicants with General risk
Non-enrolled
Non-offered
OLS
2SLS
mean
mean
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
470
0.640***
515
2.70
(102)
(0.191)
(109)
(1.87)

SAT Reading
(200-800)

470
(91)

0.803***
(0.178)
124,902

510
(93)

1.70
(1.79)
22,944

Graduated

0.611

-0.227***
(0.003)

0.793

0.064*
(0.034)

College- and Careerprepared

0.365

-0.113***
(0.003)

0.587

0.053
(0.037)

College-ready

0.321

N

-0.073***
0.541
0.019
(0.003)
(0.036)
N
120,716
19,202
Notes. This table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates of ungraded school effects produced by
the same models reported in and described in the notes to Table 4. Robust standard errors are
in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table A3. Grade A Effects with Running Variable Restrictions
4+ Gap or
No RV
4+ Duplicates
4+ Gap
4+ Duplicates
Restriction
in BW
in BW
in BW
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
2.23***
1.97**
2.91***
2.68***
(0.716)
(0.728)
(0.750)
(0.755)

SAT Math
(200-800)
SAT Reading
(200-800)
N

0.594
(0.657)
22,944

0.566
(0.669)
21,740

0.919
(0.687)
20,291

3+ Gap or
3+ Duplicates
in BW
(5)
1.37*
(0.814)

0.690
(0.695)
19,273

0.464
(0.741)
16,147

Graduated

0.029**
0.028**
0.026*
0.025*
0.024
(0.013)
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.015)
(0.017)
N
19,202
18,056
16,926
15,999
13,160
Notes. This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of Grade A school enrollment, computed as described in
the notes to Table 4. Estimates in column 1 correspond to the estimates in column 4 in Table 4 and impose no
restriction on the distribution of running variables. Estimates in column 2 are from a model that excludes
general risk that is created at screened programs with four or more duplicate running variable values in the
bandwidth. Estimates in column 3 are from a model that excludes general risk that is created at screened
programs with a gap in running variable ranks in the bandwidth of four ranks or larger. Estimates in column 4
are from a model that combines the two restrictions from columns 2 and 3, excluding general risk that is created
at screened programs with either duplicates or a gap. Estimates in column 5 are from a model that applies a
stricter version of the restriction in column 4. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

SAT Math
(200-800)

Table A4. Grade A Effects with Alternative Bandwidths
Half
Double
Using Baseline
Benchmark
Bandwidth
Bandwidth
Scores for BW
Size
Size
Computation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
2.23***
1.88**
1.88**
2.25**
(0.716)
(0.805)
(0.657)
(0.734)

SAT Reading
(200-800)
N

0.594
(0.657)
22,944

0.883
(0.733)
17,975

Graduated

-0.087
(0.607)
27,966

1.17*
(0.670)
22,005

0.029**
0.028*
0.020*
0.034**
(0.013)
(0.016)
(0.012)
(0.014)
N
19,202
15,251
23,110
18,398
Notes. This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of Grade A school enrollment,
computed as described in the notes to Table 4. Estimates in column 1 correspond to the
estimates in column 4 in Table 4. Estimates in column 2 are from a model that halfes the
size of the estimated bandwidth at screened programs. Estimates in column 3 are from a
model that doubles the size of the estimated bandwidth. Estimates in column 4 are from a
model that uses 6th grade baseline math and English test scores instead of outcomes to
compute the IK bandwidth. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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